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Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Reviewft 
' 
There has been an expolosion of theoretical and empirical writings on social 
movements and collective action within the last decade. These writings have 
triggered debates, a new school of thought, defenses of old schools of thought 
and advances. Moreover, important research on social movements is being 
conducted in various disciplines including sociology, political science, history, 
economics and communications. For example, The Central States Speech Journal 
(1980) recently devoted an entire volume to social movement articles. Studies of 
movements and protest transcend national boundaries as epitomized by the Conflict 
Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research. This group 
(Webb et al., 1983) is developing New European perspectives based on a six-nation 
study of 180 protest groups over a 20-year period (1960-1980) using a resource 
mobilization perspective. The field of social movements is thriving and 
contributions are being made from diverse camps. 
The purpose of this chapter is three fold: to review and evaluate theory and 
. research on social moments; established whether a paradigmatic shift has 
occurred and if so how; and to identify several key unresolved theoretical 
problems and suggest promising lines that research should take to solve some of 
them. 
*We are indebted to William Gamson, Lewis Killian, Kurt and Gladys Lang, John 
McCarthy, Anthony Oberschall, Neil Smelser, Charles Tilly and Ralph Turner for 
graciously allowing us. to interview them. We also thank Mary Hartness, Janet 
Somers and Sheila Wilder for typing the manuscript. 
The availahility of excellent review articles is one indication that a field 
is undergoing a renaissance. Review articles on movements from the perspectives 
of collective hehavior (Marx and Wood 1975; Turner 1981; McPhail and Wohlstein 
1983) deprivation approaches (Gurr 1980) and resource mohilization (Oherschall 
1978; Jenkins 1983) have appeared recently. Our discussion is hased on these and 
other puhlished works and ten interviews with major formulators of collective 
behavior theory (eg. Ralph Turner, Lewis Killian, Neil Smelser, Kurt and Glady 
Lang) and resource mohilization theory (eg. Charles Tilly, William Gamson, 
Anthony Oherschall, Mayer Zald, and John McCarthy). 
The taped interviews lasted apprroximately an hour and fifteen minutes each. 
They address important issues including' the theorists hackground, their 
participation in movements, the social and intellectual factors that shaped their 
theoretical approaches, whether they helieve a paradigmatic shift has occurred 
and what they consider to he the outstanding unresolved theoretical prohlems. We 
will draw on these interviews throughout and they provide core data for our 
discussion of a paradigmatic shift. Before proceeding we need to address an 
important question--what is a social movement? 
Conception of Social Movements 
NO definition of social movement enjoys a scholarly consensus and there 
prohahly will never he such a definition hecause definitions inevitahly reflect 
the theoretical assumptions of the theorist. There are a numher of competing 
frameworks in the field and each conceptualize movements differently. Even 
scholars within the same "school" define movements differently depending on their 
particular theoretical formulation. We will examine various conceptions of 
soical movements advanced hy the major schools and distinguish between 
conceptions within a school when they differ fundamentally. Thus we will explore 
conceptions of social movements emhedded in Marxian, Weherian, collective 
behavior, mass society, relative deprivation and resource mohilization 
approaches. 
Marx's View of Social Movements 
Marx was primarily interested in the causes and dynamics of revolutionary 
movements aimed at dismantling the capitalist system. He argued that movements 
grow out of hasic social and economic relations which estahlish the hases of 
power in a society. Thus, he focused attention on how capitalism generates the 
necessary conditions for a revolutionary reconstitution of capitalist societies. 
Marx viewed revolutionary movements as hoth normal, and inevitahle under 
capitalism, hecause capitalism contains and generates endemic structural 
contradictions. The main contradiction that inevitahly leads to efforts geared 
toward structural change is the existence of two classes with mutually exclusive 
interests. Marx argued that as they were faced with falling rates of profit, the 
capitalists-- "owners of the means of social production and employers of wage 
labour" (Marx and Engels, 1968: 35)-- would attempt to maintain their profits hy 
increasing their rate of exploitation of workers hecause higher rates of 
exploitation mean higher rates of profit for them. Hence, it is in the interests 
of capitalists to exploit workers as much as possihle; it is in the interests of 
workers to avoid as much exploitation as possihle. These diametrically opposed 
interests produce inherent class antagonisms which culminate into a revolutionary 
conflict hetween workers and capitalists. 
Workers -- the revolutionary class -- would engage in several stages of 
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activity to resist further efforts of exploitation. Initially workers would 
constitute an incoherent mass in which individual workers experience 
self-estrangement and powerlessness. They would attack their machinery and set 
factories on fire. In the next stage, workers form trade unions against the 
bourgeoisie through which they demand higher wages, hetter working conditions, 
and other limited objectives while engaging in sporadic rioting and localized 
violence. Next, workers create national and international networks which link 
them across localities enabling local struggles to take on national and 
international significance. In the next stage, workers organize themselves into 
a class for itself. At this time, legislatures begin recognizing the interest of 
workers, and internal differences among the hourgeoisie intensify. In the next 
stage, enlightened segments of the hourgeoisie join the ranks of the proletariat. 
And finally, the proletariat engages in successful revolution against the 
hourgeoisie, gain control over the means of production, do away with the bias of 
class antagonisms--private ownership of the means of production-- and class 
conflict dissipates. 
Marx's theory calls attention to a number of factors often overlooked by 
alternative theories of social movements. For example, he linked inequality and 
other properties of the society to the rise of revolutionary movements. He 
pointed out the centrality of interests, especially class interests. Thus, he 
made the case that participation in movements is rational, purposive activity. 
Marx also emphasized the necessity of internal organization and networkings. And 
finally, by showing how movements are products of the societies in which they 
arise, Marx showed that revolutionary movements are not abnormal occurrences 
unconnected to the larger society. Because of its focus on class, however, 
Marx's analysis may have limited explanatory power for social movements where 
other factors play prominent roles. 
Weher's View 
Weher's (1947, 1968) treatment of charismatic authority provides an overview 
of his conception of charismatic movements. He conceptualized the charismatic 
movement as a social change force, arguing that "within the sphere of its claims, 
charismatic authority repudiates the past and is in this sense a specifically 
revolutionary force" (1947:362). Furthermore, "in a revolutionary and soverign 
manner, charismatic domination transforms all values and hreaks all traditional 
and rational norms..." (1968:1115). For Weher, the struggle for power and change 
are the main ohjectives of charismatic movements. 
Charismatic movements originate in social systems that are undergoing great 
stress and are unable to meet the needs of a significant numher of people (Weher, 
1968:1121). Charismatic leaders are paramount hecause their extraordinary 
personal qualities lead people in stressful situations to treat them as if they 
possess superhuman powers. The charismatic leader attracts followers because 
they identify with his divine mission helieving that its realization translates 
into their own well being. Thus, the leader's personal magnetism and world view 
serve as the recruiting force that pulls people into the charismatic community 
where they estahlish an emotional and communalistic form of existence. 
For Weher charismatic movements are nonroutine forms of collective action 
that emerge outside of preexisting social organizations, norms, . and 
hureaucracies. such movements are inherently unstahle hecause the pure 
charismatic element provide them with resources and.solidarity only during their 
early stages. Hence, Weher advanced a life cycle scheme arguing that if 
charismatic movements are to endure they must routinize their activities hecause 
P of economic, administrative, and leadership succession prohlems they inevitahly 
face. When routinization occurs, the charismatic movement establishes a sound 
organizational base and hecome integrated into the society. 
Weher's analysis calls attention to 1) charismatic leadership, 2) helief 
systems, 3) social systems undergoing stress, 4) routinization of charismatic 
authority, and 5) the revolutionary nature of charismatic movements. 
t 
Collective Behavior View 
E 
Collective hehavior theorists view social movements as noninstitutionalized 
social change efforts (Jenkins 1983;529). Thus, Blumer (1951:199) defined 
"social movements as collective enterprises to estahlish a new order of life "and 
maintained that in the heginning," a social movement is amorphous, poorly 
organized and without form." Lang and Lang (1961:490) defined the social 
movement as "a large-scale, widespread, and continuing, elementary action in 
pursuit of an ohjective that effects and shapes the social order in some 
fundamental aspect." Finally, Turner and Killian [1972:246] define a social 
movement as: 
"Collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change 
in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a 
movement is a group with indefinite and shifting memhership and with 
leadership whose position is determined more hy the informal response of 
the memhers than hy formal procedures for legitimizing authority". 
The "social movement" is the unit of analysis in these definitions. Turner 
(1981:3) wrote "the primary focus of interests for students of collective 
hehavior is the social movement as a sociological phenomenon and as a form of 
collective hehavior." Therefore, the movement in collective hehavior approaches 
is conceptualized as a phenomenon sui generis with its own properties, processes, 
and internal logic. 
In short, collective hehaviorists view social movements as non-routine forms 
of collective action geared toward social change. They cannot he explained hy 
prior social organization, norms, and culture because movements are emergent 
forms that acquire organization during their life cycles. Once such forms hecome 
institutionalized they cease to he ohjects of inquiry as social movements. The 
tasks then are to identify the origins of movements; investigate how they give 
rise to change; analyze the fluid processes, dynamics, life cycles of movements; 
and group movements into comprehensive classificatory schemes. 
Mass Society View 
Mass society theorists view social movements as phenomena which occur when 
previously unorganized individuals hand together to change some part of their 
social millieu (e.g., Kornhauser, 1959; Arendt, 1951; Lipset, 1963; Hoffer, 1951; 
Cantril, 1941; King, 1956). Mass society definitions of movements are not vastly 
different from those of collective behaviorists. For example, King (1956:27) 
defines a social movement as "a group venture extending heyond a local community 
or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inauguratee changes in 
thought, behavior, and social relationships," and Toch (1965:5) defines a social 
movement as "an effort by a large number of people to sovle collectively a 
problem they feel they have in common." 
Mass society theorists usually emphasize the characteristics of "mass 
societies" which make movements possible: cultural confusion, social 
heterogeniety, weak cultural integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to 
secondary group structures. Thus, they are less likely than collective 
behaviorists to examine movements directly. Instead, they analyze the properties 
of societies, specify the "personality traits" and psychological states which 
those societies produce, and explain how these factors generate movements. Their 
conception of social movements calls attention to the interface between social 
- structure and personality. 
I Relative Deprivation View ~ 
Unlike collective behaviorists and mass society theorists, relataive I 
deprivation proponents have not focused attention on social movements, per se. 
Rather, they study episodes of political violence and revolution; thus their 
interest are more limited than collective behaviorists and mass society 
theorists. 
Gurr (1970:3-4), a leading proponent of relative deprivation, states that 
his research is concerned with political violence -- "all collective attacks 
within a political comunity aganist the political regime, its,actors ... or its 
policies." He further elaborates on the forms of political violence with which 
he is concerned: 
Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with 
substantial popular participation, including violent political stikes, 
riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions. 
Conspiracy: Highly organized political violence with limited 
participation, including organized political assassinations, 
small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d'e'tat. and 
mutinies. 
Internal war: Highly organized political violence with widespread 
popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the 
state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale 
terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, and revolutions (p.11). 
Thus, most behaviors discussed in relative deprivation literature qualify as 
"social movement" activity and will be included in this review. Moreover, 
theorists using the relative deprivation framework have also analyzed social 
movements (e.g., Pettigrew, 1964). Because relative deprivation perspectives 
focus on the genesis of political violence instead of social movements, per se, 
there are two points to keep in mind: relative deprivationists examine the 
genesis of political violence but do not focus on the dynamics of such violence; 
and they focus on political violence, while not analyzing other forms of 
political protest. 
Resource Mobilization View 
Resource mobilization approaches have produced different conceptions than 
those reviewed above and substantially different conceptionss of movements exist 
within the school. To capture the external and internal differences we will 
examine the approaches of McCarthy-Zald and Tilly. 
McCarthy and Zald have formulated an organizational-entrepreneuiral model of 
social movements. In their view, [1977:1217-181, "a social movement is a set of 
opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing 
some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." 
This definition excludes both organizational factors and the struggle for power. 
~ndeed, the definition implies that latent movements are forever present in 
societies because no society lack individuals who possess preferences for change. 
In McCarthy and Zald's logic social movements are nothing more than preference 
structures directed toward social change (1977:1218). 
For McCarthy-~ald the social movement can serve as one unit of analysis 
because analysts may investigate "who holds the beliefs" and/or "how intensely 
are they held?" But different units of analyses are needed to explain open 
conflict, mobilization, or outcomes of collective action. To understand those 
issues the unit of analysis shifts to movement organizations, industries, 
sectors, and entrepreneurs. Later it will he clear that McCarthy-Zald utilize 
these additional units of analysis when they investigate the dynamics between 
these various groups and preference structures for changes. Their definition of 
movements, however, differs sharply from previous ones by explicitly excluding 
actual conflict, mohilization, and social change activities. 
Charles Tilly (1973) advances a "political process" view of movements 
arguing that collective action derives from a population's central political 
processes. Tilly (1979:12) defines a social movement as: 
"A sustained series of interactions between national powerholders and 
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency 
lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make 
publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of 
power, and hack those demands with public demonstrations of support." 
~ For Tilly the focus is sustained interactions rather than the "social movement" 
I ~ as a phenomenon sui generis. Tilly (1978:49) breaks from previous definitions by 
I 
I 
refusing to treat the social movement as the unit of analysis, arguing instead 
that a movement is not a group that emerges and transforms over time. 
Tilly roots the concept of 'social movement' in historical time and space. 
The social movement is argued to he a nineteenth-century creation generated by 
the nationalization of politics and the rise of special purpose associations. 
During that century political parties, unions, and other associations became the 
chief vechicles through which groups struggled for power and institutionalized 
their interests. Still large groups remained disenfranchised without their 
interests routinely satisfied through elections and labor- management 
negotiations? Tilly argues that these people constitute social movements and 
like their institutionalized counterparts, they struggle for national power 
through special purpose associations. What distinguishes social movements from 
their institutionalized counterparts is their political situation which causes 
them to rely heavily on a repertoire of disorderly tactics such as strikes, 
demonstrations, violence and protest meetings to accomplish political ends. 
Nevertheless, social movements and formal political parties are mirror 
images hecause hoth are political actors pursuing power. In short, hoth set of 
actors are propelled hy the same political process wherein the social movement is 
a party with hroad aspirations and a unifying helief system and the political 
party is a tamed, nationalized social movement (Tilly 1979:ll). 
Tilly paints two views of a movement: that of national power structures and 
that of movement participants. Social movements from the "perspective of 
national power structures.. . are coherent phenomena; they exist so long as they 
offer a challenge to dominant interests and heliefs." But "seen from the hottom 
up,... [social movements]... are usually much more fragmented and heterogeneous: 
shifting factions, temporary alliances, diverse interests, a continuous flux of 
memhers and hangers on" (Tilly 1979:19). The task of the analyst therefore, has 
three prongs: 1) investigate the response of power holders to social movements, 
especially their ahility to protect their interests through repression, forming 
coalitions, hargaining, and cooptation 2) investigate the dynamics through which 
movement actors advance their interests hy creating the illusuion of unity, 
mohilizing large numhers of supporters, and making strategic choices and 3) 
comhine these two perspectives into a dynamic analysis of collective action The 
next section focusess on thee conceptual frameworks in which these conceptions 
are emhedded . 
Classical Models: Collective Behavior, Deprivation, and Mass Society 
Classical models differ in their approaches to social movements. Our 
strategy is to explore the common premise underlying classical models while 
highlighting their important differences. In our view, classical models explain 
the origins, development, and outcomes of social movements by focusing attention 
on 1) structural breakdown that leads to noninstitutionalized social change 
efforts 2) psychological states of movements participants and 3) the role 
shared beliefs play in guiding movements. 
Classical theorists occassionally refer to the role that prior social 
organization and strategic choices play in movements. However these are not 
central variables and do not constitute the central message of the classical 
approach. Following Patinkin (1983:314) the central message of a theory can he 
identified because it is announced early in the work (and frequently in its 
title) and by repetition, either verhatim or modified in accordance with the 
circumstances (1983:14). Our discussions of classical models are concerned with 
their central messages regarding origin, development, and outcome of movements. 
Chicago School of Collective Behavior 
The Chicago School of collective hehavior was the dominant approcti to social 
movements until the early 1970s. among its numerous proponents are Park and 
Burgess (1921), Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1957, 1972), Lang and Lang 
(1961). The collective behavior approach is social psychological in orientation 
rooted in symbolic interaction theory (~urner 1981:6). Thus social structures 
have no existence independent of subjective meanings actors attach to them. 
Symbolic interactionists focus on the processes hy which actors continuously 
construct meanings through social interactions, which provide the basis for human 
action. They argue that human hehavior cannot he understood with grand theories 
and postivist methodologies (Coser 1977:575). Rather, it is to be grasped 
through careful descriptions and synthesizing concepts which' capture the "crucial 
processes by which actors endow the forces acting up0.n them as well as their own 
hehavior with meaning" (Ritzer 1983:301). 
For Chicago theorists social order is tenuous and always evolving and 
changing. Nevertheless, they argue that everyday conventional hehavior is guided 
hy prior social organization and culture, while collective hehavior is not. 
Collective hehavior analyses hegan with the assumption that societies consist of 
two coherent realms -- institutionalized hehavior and collective hehavior. 
Building on Park and Burgess; Blumer provided the guiding conception of 
collective hehavior ; it "is not hased on the adherence to common understandings 
or rules" (1951: 171), rather, it is hehavior "formed or' forged to meet undefined 
or unstructed situations" (1957:130). The central message of the Chicago School 
is that "collective hehavior occurs when the estahlished organization ceases to 
afford direction and supply channels for action" (Turner & Killian 1972:30). 
Therefore, collective hehavior arises under some form of structural hreakdown -- 
dramatic event, migration, natural disaster, urhanization, rapid social change, . 
etc. -- that leads to noninstitutionalized efforts aimed at reconstituting 
ruptured social structures. This distinction hetween institutionalized and 
collective hehavior leads Chicago theorists to argue for a special sociology with 
its own theoretical principles to explain collective hehavior. . . 
Social movements are one form of collective hehavior. Other forms include 
panics, mohs, riots, fads, sects, cults, religious revivals, and revolutions. 
For collective hehaviorists, an inner logic permeates these forms and hind them 
into a coherent family. The logic consists of unstructured situations in which 
social organization and meaning systems no longer provide a hasis for social 
action. 
~ Chicago theorists focus on how people in collective hehavior situations act 
I collectively in the ahsence of guiding cultural definitions and social 
I organization. They investigate the cognitive processes hy which actors formulate 
I 
I a new hasis for action when confronting unstructured situations. Thus, 
I collective hehaviorists "have tended to work from the inside out, that is, 
I 
! ~ looking at people and working from there" (Turner, 1983). Killian (1983) 
1 caputred the puzzle collective hehavior is thought to give rise to: "the 
situation hecomes unstructured, the people don't have their usual sources of 
information and then they know something is wrong, hut they don't have any clear 
guidelines as to what. They have got to start reconstructing a picture of 
reaality to enahle them to act". 
The emergence and development of a movement is, therefore, contingent on 
actors formulating a shared understanding which makes collective action possihle. 
Chicago theorists (Park and Burgess, 1921; Blumer,l951; Lang and Lang, 1961) have 
aargued that crude, nonrational, psychological communicaton processes form the 
new hasis for collective action. Drawing from crowd psychologists (e.g., Le Bon, 
1960; Tarde, 1903; Sighele, 1898), they posited that contagion, circular 
reaction, imitation, suggestihility, and convergence constitute the mechanisms 
through which actors reconstitute ruptured social structures. Under such 
i influences actors are often portrayed as releasing frustrations, insecurities, 
I alienation and inner tensions. In a characteristic statement Bl.umer (1951:171) 
I wrote: 
Externally, the activity is likely to he erratic, lacking in consistency, 
and rather similiar to a sort of indefinite prowling; internally, it is 
likely to.take the form of disordered imagination and disturhed feelings. 
In its most acute form it is characteristic of neurotic hehavior." 
I In this view movements, especially in their early stages, are characterized hy 
spontaniety, emotionality and non rational hehavior. 
~urner and Killian (1957, 1972) rejected the view that collective hehavior 
I is irrational and emotional. Following Park and Burgess and Blumer, Turner and 
I Killian attempted to account for the new definition enahling people to act 
collectively when the structure hreaks. However, they differed hy arguing that 
collective hehavior is guided hy a property of social structure- an emergent 
I norm. Such a norm provides "a common understanding as to what sort of hehavior 
is expected in the situation", and it can explain why people with a great variety 
of motives came to act collectively (Turner and Killian 1972:22). Accepting the 
view that collective hehavior occurs in unstructured situations, they argue that 
"since the norm is to some degree specific to the situation, differing in degree 
or in kind from the norms governing noncrowd situations, it is an emergent norm" 
(p. 22). The new or revised or reapplied norm that guides social movements 
creates a sense of injustice and provide a "vital sense that some estahlished 
practice or mode of thought is wrong and ought to he replaced" (Turner and 
Killian 1972:259). 
The emergent norm approach suggests that movements are not fundamentally 
different from organized hehavior . Nevertheless, Turner and ~illian do not 
explicitly link movements with prior social organizations, and ongoing power 
struggles. Thus Killian (1964:427) wrote that social movements "is not the study 
of'stahle groups or estahlished institutions, hut of groups and institutions in 
the process of hecoming." Moreover, the emergent norm approach accepts the idea 
that crude communication processes are central to movements hecause the norm 
develop through a process of rumor which "is the characteristic mode of 
communication in collective hehavior" (1972:32). 
I 
I Chicago theorists argue that organization and tactics are important in the 
I 
growth and spread of movements. However, these factors are not central hecause . 
they take a hack seat to spontaneity, construction of meaning frames and social 
psychological processes. Thus Lang and Lang (1961:497) argue that movements are 
largely spontaneous and characterized hy contagion hut co-ordinated hy core 
groups. The organized core group crystalizes the vague unrest of the movement, 
hut even here the role of the core group in a movement is never planned 
(1961:493). The assumption of an uneasy fit hetween movements and organization 
is so entrenched in classical approaches that Heherle (1951:8), who pays 
considerahle attention to organizational factors, concludes that "movements as 
such are not, organized groups" and he distinguish& movements from political 
parties arguing that the latter is formally organized (1951:19). For Blher 
social movements do not come into existence with structure and organization 
already estahlished. Instead, he argues, organization and culture develop in the 
course of the movement's career. This formulation ties organization to a 
movement's development hut rules organization out as a casual factor in the 
genesis of movement. 
The emergent norm approach does'not come to grips with the role of 
organization in movements. Turner and Killian maintain "movements are in a 
state of flux, their character changing from day to day.." (1972:252). The 
emergent nor? itself... matures and crystallizes with the development of the 
movement. Turner and Killian argue (1972:247) that effective organization is 
crucial in sustaining movements hut provide no explanatory framework to assess 
and analyze organizational factors. In short collective hehavior theory is 
geared to the central message that movements hreak from pre-existing organization 
and that movement organizations are always in a state of emerging and hecoming. 
Hence, this perspective "is decreasingly applicahle to movements as they hecome 
formalized and institutionalized" (Turner, 1981:8). Additionally, collective 
hehavior theory provides little insight into the casual connections hetween 
movement emergences and prior social organization. 
Collective hehaviorists have not provided theoretically specific statements 
of movement outcomes. Pointing to this gap, Marx and Wood (1975:403) concluded 
"...most statements ahout the conseguences of social movements are primarily 
descriptive or taxanomic." The view that movements progress through stages is 
the most widely used descriptive account collective hehaviorists have produced to 
assess outcomes. This natural history approach (Dawson and Gettys, 1929; and 
Hopper, 1950) maintains that successful movements pass sequentially through the 
preliminary stage of social unrest to the popular stage, formal organization 
stage, and finally, the institutional stage. Summarizing this strategy Turner & 
Killian (1972:254) wrote it "permit us to discover the additional conditions that 
have to he present if a movement is to proceed from any given stage to the next." 
Thus, it can provide explanations "for movements that make impressive heginnings 
and then fail and for movements that have weak heginnings and suddenly hurst into 
rapid development" (1972:254). However, as Turner and Killian note, the natural 
history approach has serious limitations hecause the variety of social movements 
do not lend themselves to typical sequences and it is difficult to predict when 
movements may move hackward, forward, or skip stages. 
The influence of symholic interactions lead collective hehaviorists to 
stress the fluidity and changing character of movements. According to Turner 
(1981:5) "collective hehaviorists see goals arising, evolving, and constantly 
changing through the interplay of collective definition among movement adherents 
and puhlic opinion." Thus, "...the complex and volatile nature of movements 
makes assessments of success and failure difficult, and collective hehaviorists 
often find it more meaningful to develop theory concerning process than 
concerning movement success" (1981:5). But symholic interaction imagery is 
misleading hecause movements often pursue stahle goals such as the Civil Rights 
movement which did not swerve from the goals of desegregating puhlic facilities 
and enfranchising Southern Blacks. Nor did the antiwar movement swerve from its 
goal of ending the Viet Nam war. A fruitful theory of movements outcomes must 
account for the conditions under which movements fail or succeed to accomplish 
stahle goals and the conditions under which goals hecome ustahle and change 
overtime . 
Thus the collective hehavior perspective has directed attention from 
assessing movement outcomes hecause it often view movements and activists as 
creative victims of fluidity and evolving realities rather than as controllers of 
those processes. Tilly (1983) had this in mind when he concluded: 
"The idea that people are making some kind of a tactical choice itself, 
even if that is an implicit choice, is a liheration...There has heen alot 
of complaint in the literature recently ahout the weakness of our 
statements ahout outcomes. Why didn't we make that complaint for fifty 
years hefore? It is hecause we had a framework that didn't require it. 
In fact, even hlocked us from thinking of these events as having 
outcomes.. . " 
Smesler and the Structural Approach to Collective Behavior 
Neil Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior (1962) was a landmark in the 
field. Yet, Chicago theorists (e.g. Killian, Turner, Lang and Lang) argue that 
I 
1 
Smelser's work does not reflect the collective hehavior tradition. Turner (1983) 
stated: 
"what I want to say is that that view [Smelser's] is not from the 
collective hehavior viewpoint...they [critics] accepted that [Smelser's 
work] as the defintion of what the collective hehavior tradition is and I 
would suggest that they look hack at the real collective hehavior 
tradition." 
Smelser hroke from the Chicago School in two ways. First, his aim was to 
analyze collective hehavior with a distinctively sociological approach (1962: 1x) 
and he explicitly rejected the claim that collective hehavior and conventional 
I 
hehavior constitute seperate coherent realms of reality. He argued it is 
"possihle to use the same theoretical framework to analyze hoth conventional and 
collective hehavior" (1962:23). Second, Smelser's theoretical framework and 
style differed from the Chicago approach. Smelser's utilized grand theory to 
arrive at a theoretical synthesis of collective hehavior hy explaining these 
phenomena with Parsonian structural/functionalism. He was interested in 
identifying the specific structural conditions that make it possihle to predict 
and explain the occurrance of specific forms of collective hehavior. 
The Chicago School maintains that such a goal cannot he accomplished. 
Killian (1983) stated: "I think its dangerous ... to develop grand theory. ..some 
people think you should not do it prematurely. I think that anytime in sociology 
i 
it is premature." At hottom these different theoretical outlooks stem from the 
dehate hetween Chicago symholic interactionists and structural functionalists 
I 
during the 1950s. The latter viewed society as a functionally integrated system 
resting on a value consensus. Whereas the Chicago School "followed...Rohert 
Park's view of society as.. . a loose system of accomodation not a functionally 
integrated system...[for] Park... conflict and competition [are] the fundamental 
processes [Turner, 19831. In short Smelser rejected the idea that collective 
hehavior has unique characteristics that must he explained by a special hranch of 
sociology, and he adopted a structural functionalist approach to collective 
hehavior. 
For Smelser collective hehavior can he explained and predicted,with his six 
variahles value-added model. That model maintains that the interaction between 
structural conduciveness, strain, generalized helief, precipitating factor, 
mohilization, and social control produces collective hehavior episodes. 
In Smelser's treatment only conduciveness, strain, and social control were 
explicitly structural (Smelser 1983). Conducivness refers to the extent that 
structural characteristics permit or encourage collective hehavior. Social 
control refers to how authorities encourage, prevent, interrupt, deflect, or 
inhibit collective hehavior. The "strain" variahle is most prominent hecause it 
links Smelser's analysis to Parson's structural/functionalist framework. Smelser 
(1962:47) defines strain "as an impairment of the relations among and 
consequently inadequate functioning of the components of social action. Those 
four components of social action are: values, norms, mohilization into organized 
roles, and situational facilities (1962:24-34). Thus Smelser focuses on 
"structural strain" rather than individual strain. Hence, there is "value 
strain", "normative strain", "mohilization strain" and "facilities strain". In 
Parson's terms such strain occurs when the components of an integrated social 
system hecomes malintegrated. In Smelserian terms this is the strain that "must 
he present if an episode of collective hehavior is to occur." (1962:48). 
Mobilization for Smelser is the process by which participants are mobilized 
for action. Similiar to Chicago theorists, Smelser argued that movements proceed 
through stages and that pre-existing or newly created organizations facilitate 
the growth and spread of movements after they emerge. Smelser distinguished 
hetween the mohilizing role of preexisting and newly created organiztions 
(1962:276), hut his central message was that strain and generalized heliefs were 
the driving forces of movements while organizations and leaders facilitated the 
process after heing drawn in. In his words, "I felt that the mohilization 
dimension in my own hook was rather undeveloped. It was kind of acknowledged to 
he an important variahle hut it was not developed." 
Smelser's social control variahle focused almost exclusively on how 
authorities hlock or prevent collective hehavior. His hasic message was that if 
authorities vacilate, appear weak, or refuse to use necessary force they 
facilitate the growth and spread of movements (1962:73, 261-266). After serving 
as chief negoitator for Berkeley's administration during the Free Speech movment, 
Smelser realizied the limitation of stressing only repressive and permissive 
dimensions of social control agents; "what I came to define as much more 
important was the negotiation hetween the authorities and movement leaders...If I 
wer'e to rewrite that section on social control, I would make it more of a two way 
husiness" (Smelser, 1983). 
Smelser's approach shares hasic premises with the Chicago School. The first 
link hetween, the two is a common definition of collective hehavior. Following 
Blumer Smelser writes, "collective hehavior... is not institutionalizied. 
hehavior. According to the degree to which it hecomes institutionalizied, it 
loses it distinctive character. It is hehavior 'formed or forged to meet 
undefined or unstructured situations" (1962:8-9). Smelser argued that 
conventional and collective hehavior could he explained with a common theory, hut 
P 
follows the Chicago School hy viewing movements as noninstitutionalized hehavior 
geared toward repairing a ruptured social structure. 
The second link hetween the two approaches is the common argument that 
collective behavior forms -- panics, fashion cycles, revivals, riots, movements 
and revolutions -- constitute coherent phenomena explainable with a single 
theory. Like the Chicago School, Smelser fails to confront the idea of whether 
substantial theoretical differences exist between the various forms so as to 
warrant different theoretical explanations. That is, can the same theoretic 
logic he used to explain both revolutions and the hula hoop phenomenon? 
The third crucial link between Smelser and Chicago theorists is the view 
that a special congnitive defintion provides the basis for collective action in 
unstructured situations. Thus Smelser (1968:8) defined collective behavior as 
"mobilization on the basis of a belief which redefines social action". A central 
role is attributed to the "generalized belief" because "collective behavior is 
guided by various kinds of heliefs.. ." and it is the basis for 
uninstitutionalized mobilization as well as the criterion by which collective 
behavior forms can he distinguished. The generalized belief serves the same 
function as Blumer's "circular reaction", Lang and Lang's "collective 
redefinition" and Tuner and ~illian's "emergent norm": it provides the shared 
definition that enable people to act collectively in the task of reconstituing a 
ruptured social structure. 
However, the generalized belief differ from collective behavior accounts 
stressing rationality,' especially Turner's emergent norm approach. For Smelser 
(1962:72) the generalized "belief differ... from those which guide other types of 
behavior. They involve a belief in the existence of extraordinary forces... 
which are at work in the universe.. . the beliefs on which collective hehavior is 
based.. . are thus askin to magical heliefs." Moreover, "adherents to such 
movements exaggerate reality because their action is based on beliefs which are 
both generalized and short-circuited" (1962:72). This stress on non-rational 
heliefs lead some Chicago theorists to reject Smelser's formulation because it 
brings Le Bon and related accounts of irrationality hack to center stage. 
Moreover it does matter whether rationality or irrationality is stressed. For 
example, Tilly (1983) distunguished Turner and Killian's approach from Smelser's: 
"You dont really have the Smelserian cycle of irrational response to strain. 
What you have is people who are creatively trying to reconstruct reality...It has 
people trying to reorganizing reality so that it makes sense and constitute a 
hasis for action." Similarily, in Park's (1928) view structural breakdown may 
free individuals enahling them to hecome emancipated, enlightened and 
cosmopolitan. Yet, Smelser's stress on nonrational processes is not incongruent 
with most accounts of the Chicago School. In his words "I suppose.. . I did not 
deny that processes like suggestions, ... milling, and contagion took place." 
Rather, Smelser's ohjective was to "improve our theory about understanding these 
I 
processes hy seeing when and under what [structural] conditions they take place." 
1 SmelserCs central message that collective hehavior is non-institutionalized, 
guided hy and mohilized on the hasis of a cognitive helief and occurs under 
strain and breakdown links him with the Chicago School. This message restricted 
his structural analysis and prevented him from moving the field into mainstream 
sociology. Yet, the thrust of criticisms leveled at Smelser's formulation did 
I not stress structural features. Why then did Smelser's approach receive 
disproportinate attention and foreshadow theoretical hreakthroughs? ~ 
Our interview data revealed possible answers. Ralph Turner (1983) advanced 
an "intellectual snohhery" explanation arguing that critics "are snohs when they 
I look toward Harvard in the East Coast [and that] may account to the fact that 
I they then accepted that [Smelser] as the definition of what collective hehavior 
is and what the collective hehavior tradition is ." Tilly' s (1983) reflections 
suggest Smelser's style of theorizing may account for the attention: 
In a way the other collective hehavior people got a hum rap from Smelser. 
Because Smelser did a far more elegant joh of synthesizing the literature 
than any of them had ever done. Even though his hasis for synthesis was 
one that they would reject. [Smelser gave] dignity to what had 
previously seem to he a marginal phenomenon. 
Finally, Gamson (1983) concluded that the attention Smelser received is linked to 
the academic reward system: 
What is going on is that Smelser is getting this focus and attention 
hecause he's a student of Parsons.. . [and] hecause of its 
[structural/functionalism] influences and centrality that's what one 
confronts. There is more points to overthrowing Smelser than Lang and 
Lang. I think the point of how you score points in academia is valid in a 
lot of ways. 
Whatever the reasons for the one-sided attention, it directs the focus from 
versions of collective hehavior theory that may contain useful ideas ahout 
social movements. 
Smelser's analysis foreshadowed hreakthroughs hecause it included 
mohilization and social control as central variahles and argued against the 
need for a special field to study collective hehavior. Two resource 
mohilization scholars -- Oherschall and Gamson -- were critical of the 
thrust of Smelser's analysis hut concluded that its structural aspects were 
steps in the right direction. According to Ohershall (1983), "Smelser said 
some rather interesting things ahout social control, mohilization, 
structural conduciveness.. certain pages there ahout social control, 
mohilization, and structural conduciveness are useful." Gamson (1983) 
maintained, "I thought Smelser's theory of collective hehavior was really a 
hig step forward and I still think that way. It had a couple features that 
were different from the traditional collective hehavior approach ... It tried 
to integrate it [collective hehavior] into a more gen'eral theory [and] it 
didn't have so sharp a separation [hetween] normal institutionalized 
hehavior.. and "crazy" hehavior... [and] it hegan to suggest... an 
interaction [hetween] social control strategies of authorities and the 
outcomes of collective hehavior." Later we will examine resource 
rnohilization analyses and its focus on structural variahles. Presently we 
will address mass society and deprivation theories of movement. 
i Mass Society and Relative Deprivation Approaches 
1 The mass society perspective, another variant of the classical model, 
r shares some similaritl with collective hehavior approaches and draws from 
I 
similar intellectural roots (e.g., LeBon, 1960; Tarde, 1903; Sighele, 1899; 
? . and Durkheim, 1933). Recent proponents include Hopper (1950), Hoffer 
(1951), Kornhauser (1959), Lipset (1963), King (1956) and Arendt (1951). 
Mass society theorists (e.g., Kornhauser, 1959) argue that "mass 
societies" are characterized hy detachment and isolation. In contrast to 
pluralist and well-integrated societies, mass societies lack strong networks 
of secondary groups which cross check their memhers and lead them to he 
selective in their political participation. Mass societies have few 
structures which facilitate attachments hetween elites and masses that 
usually serve to moderate demands made on elites. These societies have 
relatively few secondary groups which socialize citizens to accept their lot 
and compromise rather than raise challenges. Moreover, such societies have 
a shortage of intermediate groups to penalize individuals for engaging in 
illegitimate means to attain their (often fanatical) goals. Finally, 
hecause the levels of group memherships are so low, high levels of 
alienation and anxiety are pervasive and the detached memhers of these 
societies are inclined toward extremist activities. 
Proponents argue that, given these characteristics, contemporary mass 
societies cannot effectively prevent people from participating in mass 
movements during periods of rapid change. Thus, religious groups, political 
parties, community organizations, trade unions, and voluntary associations 
which ordinarly restrain antisocial hehaviors breakdown and hecome 
ineffective. Primary group attachments hecome increasingly weaker, and 
atomization of the individual occurs. It is the inahility of mass societies 
to integrate and restrain people during periods of rapid change, then, that 
is the underlying source of mass social movements and other non-routine 
collective action. 
Hence, movements grow and spread hecause numerous individuals hecome 
detached and susceptihle to proselytization and suggestihility (e.g., 
Hoffer, 1951). Mass society theorists usually view movement participants as 
fanatical, irrational, malintegrated, alienated, and even psycho- 
pathological. Thus, participants are interchangeahle from movement to 
movement; i.e., they are discussed as "rehels without a cause" who are as 
likely to participate in radical movements as reactionary ones (e .g . , 
Hoffer, 1951; and Hopper, 1950). Again, movements proliferate when societal 
institutions are unahle to serve their integrative functions in light of 
rapidly changing conditions: the more anomic the conditions, the more 
likely movements of all types will flourish. 
Organizations, in this view, play a conservative role hecause they are 
integrating mechanisms which hinder rather than promote movements. As 
movements evolve, successful ones eventually hecome organizations. However, 
organization is not a prior nor concommitant facilitative conditions in the 
development of movements. In general, mass society theorists ignore 
movement dynamics and like collective hehaviorists, they have relied on life 
cycle and natural history explanations to account for movement processes and 
outcomes. 
A final variant of the classical model is the relative deprivation 
perspective which can he traced to such theorists as Mosca (1939), Pareto 
(1935), and Durkheim (1933). Recent proponents include Gurr (1968; 1970; 
1973), Runciman (1966), Huntington (1968), Davies (1962), Peetigrew (1964), 
and Croshy (1976). This approach focuses on the relationship hetween 
social conditions, perceptions of those conditions, and behaviors resulting 
from those perceptions. In most versions (e.g., Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1971; 
and Croshy 1976), proponents offer frustration-anger-aggression 
explanations. They argue that when people perceive great discrepancies 
hetween the power and privileges they posses and the amount they ought to 
possess, they hecome frustrated, angered, and suhsequently participate in 
movements and protest to offset feelings of deprivation. 
Relative deprivation theorists differ over the sources of felt 
deprivation and over the forms of deprivation (e.g., progressive1~-curve, 
aspirationlv-curve, decremental, and egotistical) that are important in 
predicting protest. Nevertheless, they agree that changes in felt 
deprivation result from rapid social changes which cause incongruencies 
hetween what people expect and what the society delivers. Rapid changes 
which generate relative deprivation include socioeconomic changes (e.g., 
depressions or economic hooms (e.g., Olson, 1963), industrialization (e.g., 
Feierahend et al., 1969), urbanization (e.g., Hihhs, 1973), political 
modernization (e.g., Huntington, 1968), and increased exposure to mass media 
and education (e .g . , Parvin, 1973). 
Therefore, it is important to examine unusually rapid and dramatic 
changes hecause they lead to: (1) changes in expectations; (2) frustrations 
ahout discrepancies hetween expectations and outcomes; (3) political anger 
resulting from frustrations; and (4) politicized anger which finds 
expression through participation in movements and protest. In short, 
periods of rapid change followed hy changes in expectations give rise to 
social movements. 
Relative deprivation theories do not claim that participants differ 
from nonparticipants, (i.e., participants are not alienated rehels without a 
cause); rather, participants find themselves in different circumstances 
which cause them to act differently. Nevertheless, relative deprivation 
shares with mass society theories the claim that movement and protest 
activity: (1) is a result of the structural strain of rapi changes in 
societies, (2) is preceded hy changes in the psychological state of those 
who participate, (3) is guided hy emotional rather than meaningful tactical 
considerations, (4) is relatively rare and short-lived, (5) is ahnormal 
hecause it is not structurally defined hy the normal operation of 
institutions, and (6) is inherently different from institutional activity. 
Because these theorists focus on macro changes and suhsequent 
psychological changes in individuals, they have paid little attention to the 
"nuts and holts" of social movements. They have not explained how 
participants coalesce, nor how activities spread hetween locales. Rather, 
collective action is treated as the result of aggregates of individuals who 
engage in similar forms of protest at the same time. Moreover, hecause 
episodes of collective action are treated as indepedent, unrelated events, 
they are not related to each other or to larger social movements. Finally, 
like other classical models, this perspective has not illuminated movement 
outcomes. 
Relative deprivation approaches have heen criticized methodologically 
and suhstantively. One prohlems stems from using aggregate indicators to 
make inferences ahout psychological states of participants. Second, no 
direct evidence has heen produced on the actual feelings of participants 
prior to protest participation (see for example, Orum, 1978; Oherschall, 
1978; Tilly, 1978; and Marx and Wood, 1975). Furthermore, critics have 
questioned how the analyst knows a priori what determines which comparison 
groups or equity norms a person will select in deciding whether he is 
relatively deprived. Third, hecause these approaches explain the genesis of 
movements on the hasis of individual deprivation, they have not elahorated 
the process hy which the relatively deprived come to act collectively. 
Finally, critics point to occasions in which rapid changes occur, hut no 
protest emerges, or when protest occurs in the ahsence of rapid change. 
Thus, critical prohlems remain for relative deprivation theories of socia 
movements and political protest. We turn now to resource mohilization 
formulations which challenge the classical approch. 
Resource Mobilization Models: Rational Action, Organizational- 
Entrepreneurial and Political Process 
The recently formulated resource mohilization approach has hecome 
central in the analysis of social movements and collective action. It has 
produced models that challenge the classical approach. As with classical 
approaches these models differ in emphases and explanations. Yet they share 
the following central message: there are no fundamental differences hetween 
movement hehavior and institutionalized hehavior; movement participants and 
their actions are rational; social movements pursue interests; movement 
mohilization occurs through an infrastracture or power hase; outcomes of 
collective action are central, and they are products of strategic choices 
made hy participants; either support or repression hy' elite groups affects 
the outcomes of movements. 
Components of the central message are hy no means shared equally hy all 
resource mohilization models. By treating the models seperately we will 
examine how each explain the origins, development, and outcomes of 
movements. 
Rational Action Approach 
In marked contrast to the view that movement and protest activties are 
motivated hy irrational impulses, the rational approach argues that movement 
participation is guided hy utilitarian cost-henefit calculations. This 
approach is akin to formulations hy Mill (1950) and other utilitarians 
(e.g., Smith, 1910; Bentham, 1789) which explain collective action in 
strictly self-interested individualistic terms. Such analyses are 
1 ultimately reducible to choice which individuals make while pursuing some 
goal which they share with others. Thus, in its "pure" .form, the rational 
a action approach explains movements and collective action as consequences of 
, 
rational choices.made by individuals in pursuit of goals which could not he 
achieved as efficiently through other means. 
Rational action proponents differ in the degree to which they relax the 
claim that utilitarian logic explains protest and movement activity. Some 
give prominence to utilitarian logic in their models and argue that 
self-interests are sufficient for explaining virtually all aspects of 
collective action (e.g., Granovetter, 1978; and Olson, 1965). For others 
the assumption that movement participants are rational is just one part of a 
more general approach which gives far more weight to group, organizational, 
strategic, and political considerations (e.g., McCarthy and Zald, 1977; 
Tilly, 1978; Gamson, 1975;. and Oherschall, 1973). Nevertheless, there is 
agreement "that the lower the risks and the higher the rewards for an 
individual and members of a group or social stratum, i.e., the lower [the] 
risklreward ratio, the more likely are they to become participants in a 
social movement of opposition, of protest, or of rebellion'' (Oherschall, 
1973:162). 
Rational actionists reject the idea that movements result from system 
hreakdowns, relative deprivation, irrational motivations, and rises in the 
levels of grievances. Instead, movements occur because individuals and 
groups resort to participation in movement activity to realize their 
interests. The McCartliy-Zald (1973:1215) version argues that, given enough 
power and resources, "grievances and discontent may he defined, created, and 
manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" which reinforce major 
interest cleavages in the society. In other words, social movement activity 
can he (and on ocassion is) manufactured and generated by those with vested 
interests in the occurrence of such activity; 
Similarly, rational action proponents argue that participation in 
social movement and protest activity is hased on a cost-henefit calculus: A 
person will participate when the perceived henefits of doing so exceed the 
perceived costs. Granovetter (1978:1422), posits a "threshold model" of 
collective action in which he defines one's threshold as "the proportion of 
the group [one] would have 'to see join [in a collective action] hefore he 
would do so." For Granovetter, a person will particiapte in collective 
hehavior only when a sufficient numhgr of others participates such that the 
risks of participation hecome reduced to the point where net henefits exceed 
net costs. He argues that hecause each individual is activated into 
collective action only when his particular threshold is exceeded, the key to 
understanding the spread of collective action is the frequency distrihution 
of thresholds, not the average preference for collective action. Thus, 
collective action occurs when thresholds are distrihuted in a manner such 
that "contagion" can occur. When lower level thresholds are ahsent from a 
distrihution, higher level thresholds will not he triggered, making the 
spread of collective action impossihle. 
Granovetter's formulation has several limitations. His approach 
explicitly assumes that collective action participants are "rational actors 
with complete information" (p. 1433, empahsis added) who always. act to 
maximize their utility. An ohvious shortcoming of such assumptions is that 
they draw attention from hehavior which do not fit economic, means-ends or 
risk-reward schemes in which individuals are all-knowing. Another 
deficiency is the omission of an explanation of how and why actors come to 
he in the same location at the same time. Furthermore, it claims that "all 
crowds are simple random samples from the population at risk" (p. 1431) and 
thus, it erroneously assumes that crowds that are socially and 
demographically different will, nevertheless, have similar (normally 
distrihuted ) threshold distributions. A related prohlem is the model's 
lack of method for determining individuals thresholds a priori, and thus, 
after-the-fact thresholds can he invoked to explain collective 
particiaption. Finally, no explanation of why collective action ceases once 
everyone's threshold has heen activated is provided. 
In contrast to Granovetter's arguments concerning mohilizing 
participants for collective action when the numher of participants is too 
small, Olson (1965) points to the difficulties involved once the pool of 
potential participants is sufficiently large and the goal at hand is not a 
tangihle product which can he divided up only among those who participate. 
Olson argues that it is not rational for a person to contrihute to or 
participate in collectiv% action when (1) the contrihution of no one person 
will make a significant difference to the group or any of its memhers, and 
(2) all memhers will receive the same collective goods regardless of their 
level of participation; therefore, - only the provision of "selective 
incentives" -- distinct, divisihle henefits (or costs) -- will provide a 
solution to this "free-rider" prohlem. Thus, given Granovetter's and 
Olson's claims, it hecomes difficult for people to participate in movements 
without receiving selective incentives. In the early stages, not enough 
people have hecome involved to make participaton cost-effective for an 
individual; similarly, when the numher of people who could make 
contributions is so great that an additional participant would not make a 
noticeahle difference, participation is not cost-effective, especially for 
an individual who will receive access to collective goods any way. 
Nevertheless, participation in the ahsence of selective incentives does 
occur (Marwell and Ames, 1979), and social movements do grow and spread. 
Rational actionists who relax the assumption that strict, individual 
self-interest and utilitarianism are of paramount importance explain 
collective action by arguing that "collective interests" exist which have 
varying degrees of conflict with individual interests (Tilly, 1978), by 
pointing to "collective incentives" (Jenkins, 1982 ) , and hy calling 
attention to "bloc recruitment" of preexisting solidary groups (Oherschall, 
1973). Rational action theorists who do not relax the assumption of strict 
individual interest (e.g., Granovetter, 1978; and Olson, 1965) are silent on 
the issue of increases in participation without increases in rewards to 
risks ratios. 
Rational action theorists who discuss outcomes of social movements and 
collective action have done so with (at least) three slightly different 
emphases: McCarthy and Zald (1977) focus on movement organizationst choices 
of support hases as being critical to understanding their successes and 
failures. For them, the selection of a support hase is a strategic task 
which has implications for the amount of resources which can he aggregated, 
the ranking of priorities and goals, the range of tactics which can he used, 
and the relation of the movement to authorities and other parties. All of 
these factors, in turn, affect the success of social movement organizations 
in realizing their preferences. In a similar vein, Tilly (1978) focuses on 
groupst "repretoires of contention" as one key in explaining outcomes of 
collective action. He argues that "actors approach defined ohjectives with 
strategy and tactics..." hut actions and outcomes "cannot he explained hy 
looking at the challenging groups alone ... they result from the interplay of 
interests, organization, and mobilization, on the one side, and on 
repression/facilitaton, power, and opportunitylthreat, on the other" 
(p.138). Given these factors, participants decide which actions will he 
least costly hut effective in the accomplishment of ohjectives. To the 
extent that these actors are correct, collective action episodes have higher 
prohahilities of success. Finally, Oherschall (1978) maintains that those 
involved in confrontations have three options which affect their outcomes: 
(1) They can suhmit to their adversaries and ahandon their cause, (2) they 
can make a conciliatory move, or (3) they can make a coercive move. He 
posits that each point in the confrontation, those involved will choose the 
alternative which maximizes their expected henefits. Thus, outcomes, too, 
are determined hy cost-henefit analyses. 
In sum, rational action approaches explicitly reject the notion that 
movement activities are motivated hy irrational impusles. Instead, they 
argue that a movement's genesis, participants, dynamics, and outcomes can 
all he understood hy examining the rational choices of individuals in 
pursuit of goals. In their pure form, however, they are virtually incapahle 
of explaining occurrences which are not consistent with the notion of 
I 
I '  
individual self-interests.' Hence, those who use rational action 
-- 
I 
I formulations have had to look to other factors to accomodate such 
occurrences. 
Organizational-Entrepreneurial Approach 
McCarthy-Zald's organizational-entrepreneurial model has hecome one 
central focus within the resource mohilization approach. This model has 
received attention hecause it seeks to explain modern American movements. 
Indeed, the model argues that these movements are hest conceptualized as 
professional movements relying on the affluent middle class for funds, 
entrepreneurial leadership, and professional movement organizations. 
Moreover, this model has stimulated research hy non sociologists including 
political scientists (Walker 1983) interested in the rise and fall of 
interest groups and comparative analysts (e.g . Tarrow, n .d .) interested in 
movements across western societies. 
McCarthy-~ald's model can he traced to three intellectual antecedents: 
organizational sociology, political science interest group theory, and micro 
economics. McCarthy and Zald's heavy stress on formal movements 
organizations derive from classical organizational studies including Weher 
(1947) Michels (1962) Selznick (1960) and Zald-Ash (1966). 
McCarthy-Zald easily transfer insights from organizational studies to 
formal movement organizations hecause such analyses take the formal 
organizations as the unit of analysis. The model also draws heavily on 
a 
Salisbury's (1969:12) exchange theory of interest groups hy adopting its 
claim that "the entrepreneur in any organizational situation is the 
initiater of the enterprise". Finally, from economics McCarthy-Zald accept 
Olson's (1965) "free rider" dilemma as a major underlying prohlem that 
analysts of collective action must solve (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1216). 
A main thrust of the model is to solve the "free rider" prohlem hy 
utilizing organizational and economic concepts. For Olson the only way to 
entice rational individuals to engage in collective action is hy providing 
each with selective incentives. In McCathy-Zald view (1977:1226) this 
solution hardly work for movements hecause such groups with serious 
ohjective deprivations and preexisting preferences for change, tend to he 
very limited in their control of discretionary resources which are crucial 
to collective action. 
Nevertheless, such groups are confronted with the prohlems of 
aggregating resources for collective purpose and huilding at least minimal 
forms of organizations. Hence, social movements groups must solve this 
mohilization prohlem in spite of heing unahle to provide their memhers with 
selective incentives. McCarthy and Zald arguments' suggest that this 
prohlem is not serious hecause modern movements depend on affluent 
individuals and organizations from outside the oppressed groups. 
By defining movements simply as preference structures for change, 
McCarthy-Zald focus specifically on the outside organizations and 
individuals which, in their view, make mohilization possihle. Key actors in 
the organizational-entrepreneurial model are social movements (SMs), social 
movement industries (SMIs), social movement sector (SMS) mass adherents, 
conscience constinuents,. professional cadre, workers, and transistory teams. 
SMOs, SMIs, and SMS are the social structures through which preferences 
for change (SMs) can he mohilized and activiated. The social movement 
sector "consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are 
attached (1977:1220). The level of resources within the SMS determines the 
emergence and viahility of SMIs and SMOs. The SMS must compete with'other 
sectors and industries hut is at a distinct disadvantage hecause it is a 
low-priority competitor which flourishes only after the satiation of other 
wants occur. The SMS is supported hy discretionary resources which includes 
money and time that can easily he reallocated to social movements. It is 
affluent middle class individuals who have discretionary resources that are 
donated to the SMS. These resources determine the likelihood that new SMIs 
and SMOs will develop and he ahle to compete. Thus societal wealth and 
donations hy affluent individuals determine the capacity of the SMS. 
The Social Movement industry consists of all SMOs organizations that 
have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences ,of a social 
movement (1977:1219). A social movement is usually represented hy a numher 
of SMOs helonging to the same industry, hut such industries is not 
necessarily dependent on any particular movement hecause firms within 
industries may produce products that can he used across industries. 
Nonetheless SMIs which are dependent on the SMS provide crucial resources 
that support the efforts of a social movement. "A social movement 
organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal organization which identifies its 
goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and 
attempts to implement those goals" (1977:1218). However, in order to 
accomplish goals SMOs must possess resources. Herein lies the prohlem 
hecause SMOs represents groups with few discretionary resources needed to 
keep the organizations in husiness, and memhers of such groups are not 
likely to participate in collective action on their hehalf hecause of the 
"free rider" dilemma. 
In McCarthy-Zald's view modern American movements have solved this 
prohlem. They argue (1973:18) that whereas major classical social movements 
of the past depended on its memhership for money, manpower, and leadership, 
"modern movements can increasingly find these resources outside of 
self-interested memherships concerned with personally held grievances". 
That is, these resources can he drawn from outside elites hecause it is they 
"who control larger resource pools" (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1221). 
Therefore modern movements are led hy professional movement organizations 
wherehy it is increasingly possihle that their financial support is totally 
separate from its presumed heneficiaries" ( 1973:18). In short, SMOs, 
SMIs, and the SMS are the structural configurations that give rise to and 
provide money and manpower for modern movements. 
Modern social movements, like classical ones, involve mass 
constituents, adherents, hystander puhlics, and opponents. Yet these groups 
cannot generate and sustain movements hecause of their limited resources. 
In the organizational-entrepreneurial model conscience constituents provide 
the money and resources that generate and sustain movements." Conscience 
constituents are direct suporters of a SMO who do not stand to henefit 
directly from its success in goal accomplishment" (1977:1222). Such 
individual have discretionary wealth which can he "made availahle to cause 
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heyond the direct self-interest of the contr++hutor." These individuals 
donate money to movements hecause they get satisfaction hy sympathizing with 
the goals of the underdog. By attrihuting a central financial role to 
conscience constituents Zald-McCarthy solve one aspect of Olson's free rider 
prohlem. Indeed, Olson (1965: 159-60) argue that "the theory is not at all 
sufficient where philanthropic lohhies, that is, lohhies that voice concern 
ahout some group other than the group that supports the lohhy, or religious 
lohhies are concerned." Thus philanthropic groups avoid the free rider 
prohlem hecause their rewards are derived from the heart rather than on the 
hasis of rational individual interests. For McCarthy-Zald it is these 
philanthropic conscience constituents that support the efforts of 
professional movement organizations. 
In the model professional movement organizations are the vechicles of 
modern movements. These organizations direct resource appeals primarily 
toward conscience adherents and tend to utilize few constituents for 
organizational lahor (1977:1223). Other key chracteristics of the 
professional movement organization include 1) a small professional 
entrepreneur cadre who provide leadership and accomplish tasks through small 
transitory teams 2) a very small or nonexistent memhership hase 3) outside 
money and resources from elite groups including foundations, churches and 
1 the government that largely support the organization and its staff and 4) 
I 
professional entrepreneurs who define, create, and manipulate the grievances 
associated with oppressed groups (1973:20). 
Social movement entrepreneurs loom large hecause they represent the 
movements' cause (at time create it) and form the organization that pursues 
the cause.(1977:1226). Given that the leadership and small transitory teams 
are hypothesized to perform the work of modern movements, McCarthy-Zald have 
solved another aspect of the free rider prohlem on two fronts. First, 
movement entrepreneurs receive selective incentives hecause the availahle 
discretionary funds from the affluent provide them with the resources to 
pursue professional movement careers. If the entreprneur is unsuccessful in 
linking to or creating grievances among the oppressed she may switch to 
another SMI where the grass is greener. Oherschall (1973:159) has developed 
a similiar view of movment ledership arguing that leaders are to he 
understood in terms of the "individual incentives, gains, risks, and 
opportunities for advancement that participation in a social movement 
represents for them. Social movements leaders are political entrepreneurs 
just as politicians are." Second, movement workers who consist of small 
volunteer transitory teams who perform the hulk of the movement's tasks also 
receive selective incentives hecause small face-to-face groups receive 
solidary incentives-selective henefits of a nonmaterial sort (1977:1227). 
In the ~cCarthy-Zald model, modern movements, then, have solved the 
free-rider prohlem pertaining to movement financial support, leadership, and 
workers. 
The central message of this model is that the growth and spread of 
modern movements is a function of societal wealth availahle to SMOs, SMIs, 
and SMS. Moreover the efficiency and achievements of such movements depend 
on ,the efforts of small professional movements organizations guided hy 
entrepreneurs rather than the intensity of grievances held by the oppressed 
group. Indeed the model argues that "in accounting for a movement's 
successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial 
importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from 
outside the collectivity which a social movement represents" [1977:1216]. 
Joining McCarthy and Zald in this important claim are Ohserschall (1973), 
Jenkins and Perrow (1977) and Lipsky (1968 all contrihutors to the resource 
mobilization approach. A similar claim was advanced earlier hy Lenin (1975) 
1 who argued that workers will not spontaneuously develop a revolutionary 
leadership provided by intellectuals in a disciplined vanguard organization 
with a clear vision and analysis to lead them. For McCarthy-Zald the 
conditions of modern society are such that the fate of oppressed group 
hinges on the activity of outside groups. 
This provocative model raises a number of issues. First, should groups 
that McCarthy-Zald discuss - AFL-CIO lobbyists, National Union for Social 
Justice, and National Council for Senior Citizens -- be conceptualized as 
movement organizations or interest groups? It is well known that many 
problems social movements groups faceTmass mobilization and solidarity, 
loyalty, intense grievances, repressive authorities, etc. -- often differ 
from those faced hy interest groups so that an important distinction needs 
to be made between the two. Oherschall (1983) pointed to this problem: 
"Zald comes at this study from organization theories. A lot of things that 
he describes are actually interest groups and they are really what he calls 
professional social movements... he always tends to emphasize the social 
movement oganization rather than the whole movement." Second, the model 
directs attention from mass-hased movements that may he "quietly emerging" 
on the modern scene. Such conceptual neglect in the 50s allowed the mass 
movements of the 60s to catch social scientists by surprise. Third, is the 
McCarthy-Zald view that poor oppressed groups are always without the 
resources needed to conduct collective action an accurate portrayal? Such 
groups have established organization, institutions, leaders, networks and 
skills. A key question is what are the conditions that lead such groups to 
mobilize and pursue their collective interests? A theory that does not take 
these factors into account can fall victim to what Morris (forthcoming, 
1984) calls the outside bias. Nevertheless, McCarthy and Zald have directed 
attention to the unique forms that some modern movements may take. 
Political process 
Major formulations of the political process model include Charles Tilly 
(1979), William Gamson (1975; 1982) and Anthony Oberschall (1973). These 
theorists are uncomfortable with the term "resource mohilization" because it 
fails to capture crucial aspects of their approaches (interviews, 1983). 
Thus Tilly (1983) stated: 
... it hrings together the idea that manipulators are somehow central to 
all kinds of social movements which I think is in fact a variable... 
Second, it identifies the amassing or spending of resources as the 
ahsolutely central phenomenon and to that extent distracts attention away 
from power struggles and from group organization. .. The term itself... 
just makes me worry that one of the least structural feature of this line 
of thought should be the thing that is singled out". 
For Gamson, Oberschall, and Tilly the study of movements is the study of the 
political process and the collection action it generates. 
Poliatical process theorists do not view the social movement as the unit of 
analysis. In Tilly's view, "the different forms of collective action are part of 
the regular processes of struggle. The coherent phenomena is a process that has 
a orderly side and a disorderly side. The central process is a process of sets 
of people acting together on their interest and that is what we ought to he 
theorizing about." The dependent variahle for political process theorists is 
collection action. Oherschall (1983) maintained: 
I feel that by emphasizing terms like resource mohilization or social 
movements, you tend to cut yourself off from the larger theory ... I feel 
very strongly that what the real dependent variahle should be is 
collective action... Collective actions are generated by interest groups, 
some are hy just routine politics, some are by social movements, other 
are hy just crowds. So there is a theoretical core around the dependent 
variahle and it is not the term social movement or mohilization, its 
collective action". 
Focusing on continuous political struggles, these theorists reject 
collective behaviorist's claim that social movement analyses require unique 
concepts and theories. According to Gamson (1983) ... you don't have to have some 
fundamental different set of processes to explain it... resource mohilization 
tries to apply or to incorporate into the single theory hoth conventional 
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political hehavior and unconventional politial hehavior." In contrast to 
collective hehaviorists, political process theorists focus on political movements 
rather - than cults, religious revivals, and the like. In Gamson's view the model 
focuses on movements engaged in political conflict and "its useful.. . to treat it 
as a conflict hetween insurgents and authorities. That's... the core of the 
dynamics." Tilly argues that fads, changes in style, panics, etc., are a 
different set of phenomena than wars, revolutions, and politial movements. Tilly 
breaks from collective hehavior arguing that '"that is part of my ohjection to 
that particular framework... hecause they are putting into the same hox, things I 
would say are not in the same family." As to the advantages of studies focusing 
on political movements Tilly maintains that "the next ones that come out are much 
less likely to he Seventh-Day-Adventists, or people who helieve that we are at 
the crack of doom... It will he less cookie stuff and more interest in explaining 
what Common Causes is doing or where the anti-ahortion forces are coming from." 
Having identified the central dynamic we can now explore how'political process 
theorists analyses the key dependent variahle-collective action. 
Why do groups engage in collective action typically ascrihed to social 
movements such as demonstrations, hoycotts, strikes, violence, riots and sit-ins? 
Political process theorists argue that it is the political situation of movement 
group that give rise to "unruly" tactics and strategies. By utilizing a polity 
model (Tilly 1978; Gamson 1975) it is argued that challengers --movement groups 
- are excluded from the polity which means they do not have routine, low cost 
access to resources controlled hy the government. Thus, the interest of 
challenging groups cannot he realized through legitimate governments hecause they 
respond to the interests of polity memhers. Collective action and its 
accompanying tactics are the vechicles of groups who rationally pursue group 
interests. It is the struggle for power hetween polity memhers and challenges 
that give rise to collective action. 
Focusing on the excluded interests of movement groups, this model 
investigates the social structures and processes enahling challengers to pursue 
power through collective action. The first requirement is that challenging 
groups have internal orgnaization. Organization is the extent of common identity 
and unifying structure among memhers of the challenging group (Tilly 1978:54). 
The relevant internal organization consists of various forms including 
estahlished institutions, professional and informal networks, and formal movement 
organizations (Morris 1981). Some formulations imply that a centralized 
hureaucratic organization is the hallmark of a movement. But this need not he 
the case because the theory has greater power when "the type of organization that 
works hest is treated as an empirical issue... It is more infra-~truct~re than a 
particular form of organization that is emphasized in resource mohilization 
theory- particularly structures of solidarity and communication" (Gamson, 
forthcoming). Contrary to classical approaches many of these forms exist prior 
to the movement and play a distinct role in generating large volumes of 
collective action. Organization is important hecause through it movements groups 
are ahle to collectively plan and strategize, hold meetings, organize and 
coordinate demonstrations, raise money, and facilitate the rnohilization process. 
In this approach organizaton is crucial to hoth the emergence and success of 
movements. 
. Though potential movement groups usually possess organizational structures 
and resources, they must he mohilized if challenges are to contend for power. 
Mobilization refers to the process hy which challenging groups gain collective 
control over recourses that make collective action possihle (Tilly 1978:84). For 
example, in the Baton Rouge hus hoycott of 1953 the cars of private citizens had 
to he collectively mohilized into an altenative transporation system; money from 
the pockets of hlack church memhers and from other hlack organizations had to he 
raised on a consistent and rapid hasis to finance the entire struggle; and, hlack 
leaders including ministers and other organizational actors had to coalesce and 
provide the boycott with collective leadership (Morris forthcoming). These 
internal resources were brought under the collective control of the newly created 
umhrella movement organization--United Defense League-- that constituted the 
hackhone of this effective boycott which was central to the rise of the civil 
rights movement. Thus "mobilization is a process of increasing the readiness to 
act collectively hy building the loyalty of a constituency to an organization or 
to a group 'of leaders" (Gamson 1975: 15). 
The political process model analyzes the link between the mohilization 
process of movement groups and their preexisting structures and resources. 
Unlike classical models which often portray new movement groups as having the 
awesome tasks of creating new symholic systems and constructing new 
organizations, political process theorists argue that the task is usually much 
easier hecause these groups already have many of these resources. "Thus the 
conflict group escapes, to some extent, ,from the great cost of starting at zero 
mohilization" (Tilly 1978:81). Preexisting organization rather than its 
breakdown facilitate mobilization. The model predicts that individuals who are 
well integrated into preexisting community structures constitute the hulk of the 
early participants of collective action (Ohserschall 1973). When preexisting 
social organization and the mohilization process are cojoined they generate 
collective action. 
Under ideal circumstances it is an increase in the organizational and 
resource capacity of a suhordinate group coupled with mohilizaton that give rise 
to movements. Resource mohilization theorists have not formulated precise 
theoretical statements of movement causation leading Smesler to argue "they don't 
talk much about what starts them, they talk ahout it once they have gotten 
started." Similiarly, Gamson concluded: 
"resource mohilization is really not so much concerned with why do people 
engage in collection action, tends to take it for granted or is 
nonprohlematic. Resource mohilization doesn't really offer a seperate 
theory of that.. It sorts of hasically assume that there are kind of 
injustices or there is some condition here that people are concerned 
ahout and the issue is sort of how, what's the process hy which they do 
that, so in that sense it really doesn't confront it directly. 
Nevertheless, in the political process approach organizational capacity and 
mohilization are preconditions that must he present if sustained collective 
action is to occur. 
Circumstances are usually not ideal for collection action hy movement 
groups. The extent of repression hy social control agents and the power position 
of challenging groups play an important role in determining whether movements 
materialize (Tilly 1978:lOO). High levels of repression and low power can force 
challengers. to withddraw from power struggles hecause they raise the cost of 
mohilization and collective action. In Tilly's view repressive action aimed at 
demohilizing the challenging group is an effective strategy against collective 
action : 
... raising the costs of mohilization is a more reliahle repressive 
strategy than raising the costs of collective action alone. The 
antimohilizaton strategy neutralizes the actor as well as the action, and 
make it less likely that the actor will he ahle to act rapidly when the 
government suddenly hecomes vulnerahle, a new coalition partner arises, 
or something else quickly shifts the prohahle costs and henefits of 
collection action" (Tilly 1978:lOO-101). 
Demohilization may occur when authorities disrupt the challenger's organization 
and' communication system and freeze crucial resouces that make a challenge 
possihle . 
Therefore, interest, organization, mohilization, and the opportunity to act 
are major variahles in the analysis of collective action. Moreover, the model 
attrihutes an active role to participants and leaders for their strategic choices 
will affect the growth and spread of collective action. In Gamson's view 
"collective action is a craft; there are skills and routines for carrying it out" 
(forthcoming). Thus Gamson is concerned with conditions enahling challenging 
groups to pursue successful rebellious careers (Gamson 1982). Similarly Tilly 
(1983) maintains that "we are much more serious now about discovering the point 
at which people turn to forms of action that authorities or even most other 
people disapprove of". Hence the model focuses on the varied strategic choices 
that confront movement participants and the likelihood of their success. 
Movement participants are confronted with organizational choices. They must 
decide whether to adopt formal or informal, centralized or decentralized forms of 
organization and they must deal with internal factionalism. Collective actors 
must make tactical choices including decisions about whether to adopt "mild 
unruly" tactics such as boycotts and strikes or whether mass demonstrations and 
violence would be more instrumental in reaching goals. The careful and explicit 
study of violence reflects the willingness of political process theorists to 
analyze and empirically investigate the instrumental role that disruptive tactics 
play in collective action. With respect to violence Tilly (1978:183) argues 
that "out of the entire stream of collective action, only a small part produces 
violence" and when violence occurs it usually grows out of strategic interactions 
among groups rather than heightened emotions. Thus, violence is normal and 
usually results from prior non-violent confrontations. Confronting the issue 
head-on Gamson (1975:81) concluded that "violence should be viewed as an 
instrumental act, aimed at furthering the purposes of the group that uses it when 
they have some reason to think it will help their causes." Thus, Gamson (1975) 
presents evidence which.suggest that groups who use violence and other unruly 
tactics are more likley to succeed. 
In addition to organizational and tactical choices, movement groups must 
decide whether to pursue limited or radical goals or some combination. This 
choice will affect the degree to which authorities employ extensive repression 
against the group. Finally, participants make decisions as to whether they will 
rely on money and resources from outside or within. In Oherschall's version, 
suhordinate groups are often portrayed as resource deficient who must depend on 
outside resources if their efforts are .to he successful. Gamson' s (1975:63: 66) 
systematic test of this proposition reveals that outside resources minimize the 
free rider prohlem hut that such groups "are only very slightly more successful 
than the others". Moreover, when the size of the movement group increases and 
when it overcomes the free rider prohlem "the help of rich or powerful sponsors 
is largely irrelevant in determining outcome." More studies documenting the 
relative advantages and disadvantaged of outside resources are sorely needed. 
In short the central message of the politial process model is that political 
movements emerge within the organizational and resource base of suhordinate 
a 
groups pursuing group interests and that mohilization of resources make 
collective action possihle. Furthermore, the growth, vitality, and success of 
I 
movements are associated with strategic choices made hy movement participants and 
leaders. Likewise, repression hy authorities and unfavorahle political realities 
increase the chances that challengers will he forced to demobilize and withdraw 
from collective action. 
Resource mohilization models in general and the political process approach 
in particular are attractive hecause they address what McCarthy call the "nuts 
and holts of movement" hy examining realities and choices that actually confront 
movement participants. However, the political process model needs a theoretical 
account that specify the variahle conditions that give rise to heavy volumes of 
collective action within given periods. Moreover, the preexisting organiztions 
and resources of challenges don't always give rise to collective action. The 
political process model needs explicit statements ahout the links hetween 
mohilization and prior organization. Here the role of ideology may he 
significant in providing the hridge that links the two (Smelser 1983). Then too, 
great movements often give rise to charismatic leaders such as Martin Luther 
King, Mao Tse-Tung, Gandhi, and Hitler. The political process model needs to 
investigate the role that charisma plays in the mobilization and success of 
movements or theoretically demonstrate its irrelevancy. We will return to these 
issues at the end of the chapter. Presently the task is to assess the empirical 
support for both classical and resource mobilization approaches 
Evidence:Classical and Resource Mobilization Models 
With respect to recent empirical findings and theoretical formulations, the 
resource mobilization approach has fared better than the classical approach. 
Proponents of the classical approach have produced studies supporting their 
claims (e.g., Gurr and Duvall, 1973); however, they have not escaped 
methodological and substantive criticisms by scholars operating within the 
classical framework and by those raising fundamental challenges to the basic 
premises of the approach. On the other hand, resource mobilization theorists 
have marshalled substantial evidence in support of their primary claims. 
Nevertheless, a number of disagreements exist among resource mobilization 
proponents and between these theorists and those using the classical approach. 
The areas of controversy include theories of social movement causation, 
distinctions between conventional and collective behavior and between social 
movement and interest groups, explanations of movement dynamics, formulations 
concerning the role of organization, characterizations of movement participants, 
and specifications of the determinants of movement activities and outcomes. The 
evidence relevant to these debates is discussed below. 
Emergence of Movements 
There is .little empirical support for the claim that movements emerge from 
conditions of structural breakdown and social or psychological strain 
accompanying rapid change and catastrophe. Contrary to the classical approach, 
Bwy (1968) reports a negative relationship hetween the rate of economic growth 
and political violence and protest in Latin American countries. Tilly (1969) 
). 
found no support for the claim that rapid urbanization, per se, leads to 
political violence. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) report a negative relationship 
between the rate of economic development and the occurrence of political 
violence. And finally, Zimmerman (1980) concludes that the sources of change 
covered (including economic growth, economic decline, urbanization, and 
modernization) proved to he unreliable predictors of political protest. Thus, 
the rapid change-breakdown-protest nexus proposed by virtually all classical 
theories is weak in explanatory power and lacks empirical verification. 
Research on the genesis of social movements has not fundamentally undermined 
resource mohilization explanations of when protest actions will occur; however, 
not much in the way of supporting evidence has been produced either. For 
example, McCarthy and Zald's (1973) argument that discontent can he created and 
manipulated by social movement entrepreneurs has not heen estahlished. McCarthy 
and Zald have modified their claim that grievances are hasically irrelevant in 
generating social movements to a modest claim that grievances are "sometimes a 
secondary component in the generation of social movements" (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977:1215). No study, however, has directly addressed the issue of whether 
discontent and grievances can he manufactured by movement entrepreneurs. Other 
resource mohilization theories which argue that grievances are virtually always 
present in certain populations (and thus are not a very powerful variable) argue 
that movements will occur when there is an opportunity to act. This position, 
which is akin to Smelser's (1962) notion of "structural conduciveness" is both 
circular and untestahle to the extent that, by definition, movement activity 
occurs when (and only when) there is an opportunity to act. In order for this 
formulation to become more theoretically fruitful, it must specify more 
concretely when and - why opportunities to act occur. Similarly, Granovetter's 
thesis is so difficult to operationalize that there has been no rigorous test of 
his threshold model. In short, the resource mohilization approach has shown that 
classical formulations regarding the emergence of movements and protest are 
fundamentally incorrect; however, they have failed to suhstantiate their 
alternative explanations and to specify the comhination of variahles that give 
rise to movements. 
Distinctions hetween conventional, collective, and interest group hehavior 
Resource mobilization proponents have effectively diffused arhitrary 
distinctions hetween "conventional" and "collective" behavior. There is little 
support for the claim that major discontinuities exist between the two. Major 
formulators of classical (especially collective behavior) approaches (e.g., 
Turner and Killian, 1957, 1972; and Smelser, 1962) have maintained that one can 
understand a great deal ahout movements by employing the same theoretical models 
used to analyze conventional behavior. Hence, Weller and Quarantelli (1973) 
argue against viewing collective behavior as the flip side of conventional 
hehavior and offer a framework stressing continuities hetween the two. Moreover, 
Marx and Wood'(1975:365) argue that the tendency to show the continuities between 
conventional hehavior and noninstitutionalized behavior has accelerated to a - 
point where important aspects of collective and conventional behavior can be 
conceptualized within a common framework. 
Distinctions have become so blurred and undefined, in fact, that some 
resource mohilization scholars are vulnerahle to the charge that they study 
political parties, interest groups, and formal organizations rather than social 
movements. Such controversies cannot be resolved until a consensus definition of 
"social movement" is estahlished, and movement scholars agree on what it is that 
they study. As pointed out earlier, no such definition now exists nor prohahly 
ever wi 11. 
Nature of participants 
Evidence concerning movement partipants is hoth suhstantial and contrary to 
classical approaches which posit that participants are detached or isolated, 
malintegrated and psychopathological, suffering from psychological strain or 
frustration, and less than rational vis-a-vis nonparticipants. Numerous studies 
show that individuals who first participate in social movements and protest are 
well-integrated into collectivities (e.g., Morris, 1981; Flacks, 1967; Paige, 
1971; Freeman, 1973; Fogelson and Hill, 1968). Several studies have refuted the 
notion that movement participants are psychopathological and malintegrated (e.g., 
Keniston, 1968; Flacks, 1967; Kerpelman, 1972; and Ahromowitz, 1973). No direct 
evidence has heen presented which demonstrates that participants suffer from 
strain or frustration, and Orum (1972) found no relationship hetween feelings of 
deprivation and participation in his study of the hlack student movement. And 
finally, no evidence demonstrates that movement participants are any less 
rational than nonparticipants. In short, most claims ahout movement participants 
that. theorists within the classical approach have presented have not heen 
supported empirically. 
Nevertheless, debates ahout the nature of movement participants continue. 
One dehate has revolved around the "suprarational" participant advanced by some 
rational action theorists. Hence, the question has heen "when will people 
participate in collective action?" Extreme rational action views posit that 
individuals will participate inlcontrihute to collection action only when it is 
cost-effective for them individually; others claim that loyalty and solidarity 
factors override the utilitarian logic. Experimental evidence supports the 
latter view. A second area of controversy involves the contention hy the 
organizational-entrepreneurial perspective that movements among underdog groups 
do not rely on indigenous leadership, mass participation, and resources from 
grass root sources. Bailis (1974) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977) have provided 
support for their claims; however, Morris (1981, forthcoming, 1984) and McAdam 
(1982) have presented evidence to the contrary. Clearly though, this controversy 
is concerned with the sources of resources (leadership skills, manpower, funding, 
etc.) rather than their centrality to movements. 
Dynamics, Growth, and Spread of Movement Activity 
Explaining the dynamics of social movements and protest activity has heen 
one of resource mobilization's strong points. Meanwhile, classical approaches 
that rely on "natural history" and "life cycle" formulations to explain movement 
dynamics have heen found to have limited explanatory power, as numerous studies 
have demonstrated that movements spread and are mohilized through friendship, 
familial, and organizational networks which precede movement activities (e.g., 
Freeman, 1973; Morris', 1981; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). In 
explaining the process hy which movement activity spreads from one location or 
occurrence to another, the arguments offered hy classical theorists -- contagion 
(Lang and Lang, 1961), imitation (Tarde, 1903), suggestion (Le Bon, 1960), 
circular reaction (Blumer, 1951), and emergent norms (Turner, 1964) -- have heen 
challenged hy collective hehaviorists (McPhail, 1973; and McPhail and Wohlstein, 
I 
I 1983) and theorists employing a resource mohilization perspective (Freeman, 1973; 
Morris, 1981; and Molotch, 1979). Numerous studies have documented the 
centrality of leadership, skills, "know-how", and strategizing and planning. All 
of. these factors are consistent with resource rnohilization explanations of 
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movement dynamics. The resource mohilization approach, then, in contrast to the 
classical approach has made significant, empirically verifiahle contrihutions to 
understanding the dynamics of social movements. 
Role of Organization 
Generally, the notion that organization is an after-the-fact outcome of 
prior movement stages has not heen supported, and the availahle evidence clearly 
suggests that organization facilitates rather than hinders the efforts of social 
movements. Numerous studies have pointed to preexisting organizations as crucial 
in mohilizing participants for protest activities (e.g., Morris, 1981; Gamson, 
1980; Freeman, 1973; Gerlach and Hine, 1970; and Aveni, 1978). For the most 
kind of organization. The emerging concensus suggests a conditional -
relationship; that is, it depends on the goals pursued, the strategies employed, 
the nature of memhership, the tactics that social control agents employ, and 
other factors. In short, findings on the role of organization in movements are 
counter to what classical approaches predict; therefore, future dehates ahout the 
role of organization will center around issues well within the domain of the 
resource mohilization perspective. 
Determinants of Movement Outcomes 
Research on movement outcomes has shown that the life cycle approach is at 
hest incomplete. In fact, there is now general agreement that organization, 
resources, strategic choices, and political context affect movement outcomes; 
however, there has heen little empirical research to confirm or refute most 
formulations. Notahle exceptions include Gamson (1975), Snyder and Kelly (1976), 
Isaac and Kelly (1981), and Gamson et a1 (1982). Gamson (1975) for example, 
found that several factors are associated with movement success -- the attainment 
of tangihle goal-related henefits and formal acceptance hy movement antagonists: 
reliance on hureaucratic organization, use of selective incentives, pursuit of 
narrowly defined goals, and use of "unruly" tactics. However, Goldstone (1980) 
challenged these findings hy arguing that Gamson's analysis involved simple 
(hivariate) relationships, and that hy controlling for the political context and 
the nature of goals, these relationships disappear. Also, Piven and Cloward 
(1977) argue directly counter to Gamson hy claiming that poor people's movements 
realize gains from mass defiance, not organization. Moreover, organizations in 
the Piven-Cloward view are antithetical to gains for the poor hecause they 
de-radicalize movement demands, channel mass insurgency, and therehy limit the 
gains of movements. Their argument that mass insurgency itself produces gains 
has received empirical support (e.g., Isaac and Kelley, 1981); however, contrary 
to their thesis, organization facilitated the gains of the Civil Rights movement 
(Morris, 1981; 1984; and McAdam, 1982) and the worker's movement (Gamson and 
Schmeidler, forthcoming). 
Other factors also influence movement outcomes. Gamson et al. (1982) 
provided experimental evidence showing that available leadership skills, 
know-how, and other resources have positive effects on mobilization of collective 
action and thus on outcomes. Others (e.g., Marx, 1974, 1979; Oberschall, 1978b; 
and Tilly, 1978) have argued that the nature of repression/facilitation by 
authorities affect outcomes. And a number of tactics and strategies have proven 
to promote successful outcomes. In sum, it is clear that organization, 
resources, strategies, and the nature of repression/facilitation affect movement 
outcomes depending on the nature of goals pursued. What is not clear, however, 
is how 'these factors affect outcomes and what their relative importance is in -
determining outcomes. 
Assessments: 
Collective Behavior. In light of the empirical findings where do collective 
i behavior explanations of social movement stand? In general, they lack support 
for many of their fundamental arguments including the notion that structural 
breakdowns and subsequent strains give rise to movements. Fewer collective 
I behaviorists now argue that there are inherent, clear-cut distinctions between 
collective behavior and conventinal behavior. The life cycle and natural history 
formulations have been found lacking in explanatory power. And some collective 
behaviorists concede that their formulations underestimated the positive, 
facilitative role that preexisting oganization plays in the gensis of movements. 
In short, while there is not sufficient reason to reject collective behavior 
explanations of social movements, there is definite need for major reformulation 
of this basic approach. Indeed promising reformulations are underway (see 
McPhail, 1973; Snow et al., 1981; and Pinard, 1983). 
Mass Society. The mass society approach has, for the most part, been 
disconfirmed hy scholars hecause of the overwhelming negative evidence against 
its hasic tenents. ~ t s  claim that movement participants are psychopathological, 
irrational, malintegrated, etc. has heen shown false and research repeatedly 
shows that the argument that organizations impede social movements is untenahle. 
Mass society formulations also share some of the same limitations as the 
collective hehavior approach: lack of support for the notion that hreakdown 
leads to movements; lack of evidence for the claim of discontinuities hetween 
conventinal and non-institutional hehavior ; and prohlems with using the life 
cycle approach to account for movement dynamics and outcomes. Clearly, the 
evidence does not support the central claims of mass society approaches. 
Relative Deprivation. Though relative deprivation fares hetter than the 
mass society approach, it too needs convincing evidence for many of its 
fundamental premises. For example, research using individual level data (as an 
accurate test of the theory requires) has demonstrated that relative deprivation, 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient precondition for the genesis of movements 
and protest. Moreover, the approach is ineffective in explaining how group 
hehaviors result from psychological and individual tendencies; in other words, 
relative deprivation theorists have not sufficiently accounted for movement 
dynamics nor group activities within movements. In terms of organizations and 
the determination of movement outcomes relative deprivation theorists have 
offered little meaningful theory, and thus, their analyses are also lacking in 
this regard. Unlike other classical moels (especially mass society theories), 
however, this approach does not necessarily preclude the role of organization or 
tactics, nor does it require life cycle explanations to account for movement 
dynamics or outcomes. Nevertheless, hecause of theoretical gaps and 
contradictory empirical findings, the relative deprivation approach, like the 
other classical theories, is in need of major reformulation and correction. 
Rational Action. The rational action perspective lacks hard evidence for 
many of its central claims. For example, there has been no rigorous test of (and 
thus no support for) Granovetter's threshold explanation of the origins of 
collective action and participation. Nor has there been a test of the 
McCarthy-Zald claim that grievances can he manufactured by movement 
entrepreneurs, nor the general claim that participation is a function of strict, 
cost-benefit calculations. Marwell and Ames (1979) provided experimental 
evidence which contradicted Olson's claim that selective incentives are necessary 
to overcome the "free-rider" problem, and thus challenged his portrayal of 
collection action participants. There are no data to support the "suprarational" 
model of participants posited by extreme versions of this perspective. However, 
findings about other aspects of movements -- distinctons between social movements 
and other phenomena, dynamics of movement activity, the role of organization, and 
the determinants of movement outcomes -- are not incompatible with rational 
action formulations, but neither are they central to many of these. formulations 
(especially Granovetter's and Olson's). In short, there is a lack of evidence 
concerning rational action formulations about the emergence of movements, 
disconfirming evidence about the nature of participants, and compatible evidence 
about other aspects of social movements. 
Organizational-Entrepreneurial. Research investigating the central 
formulations of the organizational entrepreneurial perspective has produced mixed 
results. For example, research has shown both support for and evidence against 
the McCarthy-Zald contention that movements among underdog groups no longer rely 
on indigenous participation and support. Other unresolved issues which directly 
involve organizational-entrepreneurial perspectives include controversies over 
! 
the nature of participants (e.g., suprarational vs. intendedly rational, 
I 
I 
~ indigenous vs. . "conscience constituents", and self-interested vs. group 
~ interested), and the type of organization which facilitates movement success 
I 
I 
I (centralized bureaucracy vs. loosely structured, informal networks vs. no 
organization). There is also continued dehate over how movements are mohilized 
(through bloc recruitment vs. through selective incentives vs. through solidarity 
and/or loyalty to causes). Most of these dehates are occurring &thin the 
resource mohilization framework, and thus will not undermine the resource 
mohilization approach. 
Political Process. Research on social movements has provided support for 
the political process perspective; nevertheless, there have heen critics. 
Critics have raised questions ahout the model's tendency to focus on 
organization, resources, and strategies to the neglect of grievances and 
deprivations (Gurr and Duvall, 1973; Zimrnerman, 1980; and Pinard, 1983) and the 
occurrence of crises (Goldstone, 1980). Citing evidence from a numher of 
empirical studies (e.g., Legget, 1964; Pinard and Hamilton, 1977; and Isaac et 
al., 1980), Pinard (1983) claims that political process proponents have 
prematurely dismissed the effects of socioeconomic deprivations on. movement 
participation and support for collective action. He argues that hecause. 
political process theorists concluded that deprivations do not give rise to 
movements, they wrongly rejected the argument that the relatively. deprived are 
more likely to support and participate in non-routine collective action. 
Pinard's critcism of this perspective's tendency to hlur distinctions hetween 
"emergence" issues and "participation/support" issues is valid. However, the 
characterizations of movement participants offered hy political process theorists 
are, for the most part, consistent with the existing evidence. 
As pointed out earlier, Goldstone's (1980) claim that organizational and 
strategic matters are insignificant in determining outcomes does question the 
fundamental premises of the political process perspective. Gamson (1980), 
I however, has questioned the validity of Goldstone's findings on the grounds that 
they are hased on faulty definitions, operationalizations, and codings .of key 
concepts. Thus, Gamson's (1975) analysis of organization, strategies, and 
resources is still a major statement providing empirical support for key 
arguments of the political process model. 
Has a Paradigmatic Shift Occurred? 
This section attempts to determine whether a "paradigmatic shift" in how 
social scientists theorize ahout social movements and non-routine collective 
action has occurred. More specifically, it investigates whether the resource 
mohilization perspective has become dominant in the study of social movements and 
collective action. In doing so, it compares how frequently articles puhlished in 
major social science journals since 1949 have employed the resource mohilization 
approach versus the classical model's and others over the last four decades. 
Method 
The first task is to determine whether most movement analyses have shifted 
from the classical approach to the resource mohilization approach when explaining 
the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of social movements and other non-routine 
collective action within the period. To address this issue, articles concerning 
social movements and related phenomena in the 1949-1983 volumes of the American 
Sociological Review, the American Journal of Sociology, the American Political 
Science Review, and Social Forces were reviewed and categorized according to the 
theoretical approaches they used. Though our method has the limitation of 
excluding other measures of change in theoretical emphasis such as dissertations, 
hooks, social movement course syllahi, and other media outside of the major 
social science journals, we, nevertheless, helieve that our indicator is a 
reliahle one hecause journal puhlications reflect the work of many of those who 
actively contribute to the literature on movements. 
To classify journal articles, ideal types for the classical approach and the 
resource mohilization approach were constructed. Tahle 1 summarizes these ideal 
types hy illustrating how "pure type" articles would address questions ahout the 
properties of social movements and non-routine collective action. Using these 
ideal types as the standards, articles were classified as "classical approach" if 
the majority of their explanations were consistent with classical responses, 
"resource mohilization" if they were .predominantly consistent with resource 
mohilization explanations, and "other" if a majority of their explanations were 
consistent with neither the classical nor the resource mohilization approach. 
(Tahle 1 Ahout Here) 
Articles included in the analysis are those which discuss aspects of the 
following suhject matter: social movements, strikes, riots, revolutions, crowds, 
tF 
rehellions, protests, political violence, civil conflict, and various forms of 
demonstration (e.g., sit-ins, marches, hoycotts). The greatest difficulty 
involved deciding which activities traditionally studied by collective 
behaviorists (e.g., panics, fads, crazes, revolutions, riots, religious cults) to 
include. Such activities were included only when the case was made that they 
share with social movements similar causes, dynamics, and consequences. This 
decision is arhitrary; however, results are hiased toward finding that the 
resource mohilization approach has gained dominance only if there has heen an 
increase in the proportion of studies which investigate such "collective 
hehavior" from a non-resource mohilization perspective. There is little reason 
to helieve this is the case (see, for example, Weller and Quarantelli, 1973; and 
Marx and Wood, 1975). 
Results 
Tahle 2 presents the percentage distrihution of social movements and 
non-routine collective action articles appearing in major social science journals 
hy theoretical approach and period of puhlication. This tahle shows that in 
recent years, there has heen a major increase in the percentage of journal 
articles using the resource mohilization approach, and a parallel decrease in the 
percentage of articles which have employed the classical approach. By the 
1970fs, over half of the social movement and collective action articles in the 
Table 1 
Summary Of How The C l a s s i c a l  Approach And Resource Mobi l iza t ion  I d e a l  Types 
Would Respond To Questions About The P r o p e r t i e s  Of S o c i a l  Movements 
Quest i on  
1. A r e  movements d i scussed  1. Yes 
as i n f r e q u e n t  unusual,  -+ 
phenomena? 
2. What a r e  t h e  causes  of . 2. Cr i se s ;  breakdowns; r a p i d  2.  Pu r su i t  of i n t e r e s t s  
movements? changes 0 u n a t t a i n a b l e  through l e g i -  
t imate .  
3. Is movement behavior  3. Very d i f f e r e n t ,  guided 3. Very s i m i l a r ;  guided by t h e  
more s i m i l a r  t o  o r  d i f f e -  - by cogn i t i ve  d e f i n i t i o n s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and o rgan iza t iona l  
r e n t  from ?conventional."l, - - t h a t  emerge i n  unusual  f a c t o r s .  
behavior? s i t u a t i o n s  . 
4. What i s  t h e  n a t u r e  of 
p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
5. Why do people 
p a r t i c i p a t e ?  
6. How is  i t  t h a t  move- 
ments grow and spread?  
7. What r o l e  does organi-  
z a t i o n  p lay  i n  s o c i a l  
movements? 
8. Is t h e r e  a t t e n t i o n  
t o  s t r a t e g i e s  and 
resources?  
9,. What accounts  f o r  t h e  
outcomes of movement 
a c t i v i t i e s ?  
4. Under psychologica l  . -. 
s t r e s s  ;, i r rat ional . ; .  . 
a l i e n a t e d  
5. To r e l i e v e  s t r e s s  o r  
f r u s t r a t i o n ;  t o  recons- 
t i t u t e a a  new s o c i a l  o r d e r ,  
6. Contagion; c i r c u l a r  
, r e a c t i o n ;  d i f f u s i o n ,  
emergent norm. 
7. Not c e n t r a l ,  b u t  may 
h inde r  movement ga ins .  
Comes a f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  
s t a g e s  of a c t i v i t i e s .  
8. Limited t o  n o n e x i s t a n t ,  
9. Natural  h i s t o r y  of 
movements o r  unpred ic t ab le  
occurrances.  
4. Rat iona l  wel l+ntegra ted  
bers;  of,  o rgan iza t ions  and com- - 
u n i t i g s  '(sometimes) . , 
i d e 6 i b g i c a l l y  committed, . 
5. To r e a l i z e  group o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s  
6. Thru mob i l i za t ion ,  networks ; 
accumulation of resources a n d  
s t r a t e g i c  use  of t a c t i c s .  
7.  Cen t r a l  t o  r e a l i z a t i o n  of 
ga ins .  E x i s t s  p r i o r  t o  and 
dur ing  movements a c t i v i t i e s .  
8. Y e s ,  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e s e  i s  
c e n t r a l  i n  terms of hypothes is  
and p ropos i t i ons .  
9.  Nature of goa l s ,  organiza-  
t i o n s ,  s t r a t e g i e s ,  r ep re s s ion ,  
power, and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  a c t .  
Table 2 
S o c i a l  Movement And C o l l e c t i v e  Action A r t i c l e s  Appearing I n  Major 
S o c i a l  Science Jou rna l s  By T h e o r e t i c a l  Approach, 1949-1983 
Years  heo ore tical Approach Used 
C l a s s i c a l  Theory Resource Mobi l i za t ion  0 t h e r  To ta l  
T o t a l  
* 
Major j ou rna l s  i nc lude  the  American Soc io log ica l  Review, the  American Jou rna l  of Sociology, 
S o c i a l  Forces,  and the  American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review. 
major journals (56%) used the resource mohilization approach. In the 1980s, more 
than 2 out of 3 of these articles (68%) used the resource mohilization approach. 
This is in sharp contrast to the 1950s when over 80% of these articles used some 
variant of the classical approach, and fewer than 6 out 100 used the resource 
mobilization approach. A chi-square statistic of 34.01 with 6 degrees of freedom 
suggests that these differences are statistically significant at p<.001. The 
remainder of this section will discuss the major social and intellectual factors 
which facilitated this theoretical shift in particular, and the optimal 
conditions for theoretical innovations in general. 
(Table 2 About Here) 
Social Factors 
The 1960's movements were critical in the shift from classical models to the 
resource mobilization approch. The civil rights movement, student movement, and 
women's movement rocked America with such force that they attracted the attention 
of movement scholars. Moreover, these movements had major campus components 
which enahled scholars to hecome sympathizer/participants and attain a close-up 
view of movements not possible through secondary sources. 
Movement participation led future resource mobilization proponents to 
sharpen their criticisms of existing theories and to accentuate their specific 
limitations. For example, Oberschall maintained that his participation resulted 
in a better understanding of movements and "even if I read other people's 
descriptions of them, I understand a lot better what they were describing and in 
fact not describing." Referring to prior theories and his participation, 
McCarthy stated "they weren't wrong as much as they didn't "resonate". I read it 
and I didn't know more ahout what I participated in than I knew before I read 
it." The view that participation allowed one to observe movement phenomena 
usually ignored by prior theories was a common theme of the interviews. 
Second, participation by collective hehaviorists and resource mobilization 
theorists generated greater appreciation for the complexity of movements. 
Participation alerted scholars to the significant ideological, tactical, and goal 
divisions within movements and the necessity of coalition building. Thus Tilly 
relates that "one thing that I learned was how phony that most notions of a 
unified movement are." He continued, "this notion that you hegin with a unified 
population and then some people mohilize that population on hehalf of a set of 
heliefs they already have and that this group is a social movement...I hecame 
skeptical ahout that way of portraying the whole thing." Tilly's participation 
in part, led him to a line of reasoning that says "look for organizing groups, 
look for recruiters, look for the making of coalitions, look for people deciding 
that the enemy of my enemy is my friend." It is these kinds of dynamics that 
occupy a central place in resource mohilization theory and direct participation 
was crucial in revealing their significance. 
Third, participation and sympathy with the 1960s movements led resource 
mohilization theorists to reject idelogical hiases often inherent in classical 
models. Gamson explained, "when you are participating, you inevitahly look at it 
from the standpoint of participants in social movements." Additionally, 
"collective hehavior theories engaged in a slightly insulting or put down quality 
hy denigrating the motives of the participants." They emphasized "psychological 
motives rather than the collective goals of the movement. The natural tendency 
is to look around for some theoretical explanation that really reflects the 
experiences that one is having, addresses the prohlems that ones experiencing as 
a participant." Again, this theme was prevalent among resource rnohilization 
theorists interviewed, and reflect, in part, their inclination to analyze 
movement goals, organizations and outcomes. 
This discussion suggests that the movements of the 1960s were crucial to the 
paradigm shift. Gamson summed it up: "if there hadn't heen a civil rights 
movement there might not have heen an anti-war movement, if there hadn't heen 
these movements there might not have been an environmental movement. Without 
these movements there wouldn't have been people coming into the field who were 
receptive to a new orientation." 
Intellectual Factors 
The 1960s movements highlighted the limitations of previous theories hut 
subsequent intellectual activity pushed the field in new directions. 
Specifically, intellectual criticism and the incorporation of ideas from other 
fields were important in the formulation of resource mohilization theory. 
Intellectual criticism of dominant orientations is crucial to breakthroughs. 
In the 1950s and 60s structural functionalism and related frameworks were 
attacked by conflict theorists (Mills, 1956; Coser, 1956; Dohrendorf, 1959; and 
Pilisuk and Hayden, 1965) who argue that conflict and change were endemic to 
societies rather than abnormal or marginal. Future proponents of resource 
mohilization absorbed and contributed to the conflict literature. However, that 
literature as Tilly argued,' "so clearly took on the lineaments of the theories 
they were criticising ... It is useful polemically hut what is the alternative 
structure that they give you that can then organize reality?" Conflict theory 
provided the critical mood conducive to formulating an alternative perspective. 
Our data strongly suggest that alternative theories emerge slowly from a 
series of polemical statements and internal criticisms. In terms of resource 
mohilization theory, Tilly's experience was fairly typical: "What I was trying 
to do is play this negative game of showing that the standard notions about 
marginalization, mass society, and so forth were wrong...for'a long time I found 
myself getting somewhere, hut not very far, mainly by attacking existing ideas." 
The period of negative statements and groping is only the first step toward 
providing an alternative theory. Tilly recalled, "I am saying, look I can't 
settle for that. Other people are saying, alright put up or shut up. What is 
your alternative? But I am saying to myself the same thing." Thus, the stage is 
set for further theorizing." Tilly continued: "In that process of struggle with 
my own schemes I started trying to map out the organization and the basis of 
collective action for the groups that I was looking at." These data suggest that 
theoretical breakthroughs result not from inspirational flashes but a long 
process of internal criticisms and reworking of ideas. 
The interview data revealed that the major formulators of resource 
mobilization borrowed and incorporated .ideas from disciplines other than 
sociology. Even within sociology ideas were often borrowed from outside the 
social movement area, especially from organizational sociology. Similarily, 
ideas from anthropologists and historians of revolutions (e.g., Rude, 1964; 
Hobsbawn, 1959; Soboul, 1958; Wolf, 1966) were crucial in the formulation of 
resource mobilization. According to Oberschall, "what greatly helped 
intellectually was that very prominent historians like George Rude and a whole 
bunch of historians were rewriting history of popular uprising in Britain and 
France and Western Europe. It wasn't just something happening in sociology 
intellectually. It was being sustained at the edges of sociology." We have 
already seen how public choice theories (e.g. Olson, 1965) in economic and 
entrepreneueral theories in political science (e.g. Salisbury) played a central 
role in the development of resource mobilization. 
In short, related or parallel ideas developed in other disciplines 
facilitate the formulation of an alternative perspective within a given field . 
As McCarthy put it, "you are in this intellectual environment and you are picking 
what you can find and trying to stir it together." Thus both external and 
internal criticisms coupled with thg borrowing of ideas from other disciplines 
were the intellectual soil from which resource mobilization emerged. 
Institutional Factors 
An alternative set of ideas do not take root in a field simply because of 
intelletual merit. Institutional factors including the prestige and resources of 
universities, informal networks of scholars, and the academic reward system are 
central to paradigmatic shifts. 
Innovative scholars are in a good position to trigger a paradigmatic shift 
if they hold appointments in prestigious universities. Tilly maintained that 
"there is a tremendous advantage of being at the big, rich; prestigious 
university." He explained: 
I spent my first six years at the University of Delaware, wishing I were 
somewhere else and having no opportunity to go anywhere else. I felt 
acutely what it was like to think that you have pretty good ideas and get 
no recognition for it. Moving to Princeton and then to Harvard as I did, 
gave me a sounding hoard that I didn't' have before that time. It was 
' astounding how much difference that made in contacts. 
Other resource mobilization theorists (e.g., Gamson and Oherschall) also 
concluded that a prestige effect is usually central to paradigmatic shifts . 
Second, prestigious universities provide well prepared students and faculty 
who facilitate paradigmatic shifts. Oherschall explained that "you get students 
who understand you and can work for you and you don't have to explain everything 
to them. And you get support from faculty who recognize what you are doing." 
Gamson maintained that at a university like Michigan you "can attract .good 
students who will start writing and citing that work. Tilly is on something like 
48 dissertations. These are people who start writing hooks and become visible 
using the new orientation." Finally, Tilly underscored the centrality of faculty 
at prestigious universities, "you tend to he surrounded by people who know how to 
work the system. That is how they got there. They are often wiling to tell you 
how to work the system." 
Informal networks within a scholarly community facilitate paradigmatic 
shifts. The majority of the original formulators of resource mobilization were 
only vaguely aware of each others work before the orientation took root. 
Oherschall stated, "it wasn't people getting together in a smoke-filled room and 
saying this is the party line and we are going to push it. We got to know each 
other really afterwards and we discovered that we had some common interest and 
views." Tilly pointed out how informal contacts solidified the new orientation, 
"these people have means of making contact with each other. They send each other 
papers, they introduce each other, they form conferences and so forth. These are 
network building events that establish the creditibility of a person for the next 
round of contacts." 
Finally, the academic reward system facilitate paridigmatic shifts 
especially among scholars who are dissatisfied with the dominant orientation. 
Tilly explained that academicians, "are very sensitive to a demonstration of 
originality. All it takes is a relatively small number of people getting 
recognized as a tour de force for having done something original and coherent, 
bright and so forth, for other people'to say, gee I want to be in on that too." 
Gamson pointed out that scholars who adopt the new orientation get socially 
rewarded because they get things published using it and so forth. In Smelser's 
view the academic reward system generates paradigmatic shifts in a cyclical 
fashion across generations: 
The generation effect is not 20 years but of 5 to 10 years or variable. 
People have to make their own way in the world. They can't simply say 
that this is the given and received view of things. The new orientaton 
has to be different. It has to provide some alternative and there has to 
be some rejection of what went before. 
Thus a bandwagon effect whereby additional scholars join the original formulators 
> and publish works that give the new orientation visibility is necessary for 
paridigmatic shifts to occur. 
Drawing from the above discussion and from our interview data, we conclude: 
the rise of a school of thought occurs when scholars usually working 
I 
independently, formulate a set of coherent premises capable of generating a 
I 
I theoretical shift and when scholars other than the original formulators lahel the 
original group as a distinct school and act accordingly hy producing research 
that either supports or undermines the new orientation. In general, the optimal 
conditions for a paradigmatic shift include 1) a social environment that provides 
a natural laboratory in which to ohserve theoretically problematic phenomena, 2) 
a field that is obviously deficient theoretically to critical and creative 
scholars who are aware of fruitful ideas in other fields and who occupy 
appointments in leading academic institutions and 3) the availability of 
ambitious scholars capable of triggering a bandwagon effect hecause of the 
compelling logic of a new orientation that clearly break from previous 
formulations. 
Resource Mobilization: Fad or Suhstance? 
Is resource mobilization a new theory of social movements that will endure 
, 
over time? Or, is it an intellectual fad masquerading under new labels? 
Collective behaviorists whom we interviewed (e.g., Turner, Killian, Lang, and 
Smelser) maintained that resource mobilization is not a theory hut a re-emphasis 
because it fails to incorporate ideology, the social construction of reality, 
deprivation and grievances and causal factors all of which they believe important 
in explaining movements. Resource mobilization proponents concede that their 
approach is not a comprehensive theory hut argued that it has provided verifiahle 
theories concerning mohilization, nature of movement participants, social 
organization, and outcomes. Tilly agreed with this position but came down' on the 
side of collective hehaviorists hy arguing that resource mohilization at this 
stage is not a theory. He stated: 
What we have right now is some interesting concepts, some pretty good 
ways of matching observations with those concepts, some apprehensions 
ahout how the processes involved work, and an empirical program of a 
kind. That's not had, alot of enterprises in social sciences operate for 
awhile on nothing much more than that. 
Turner, Killian, and K. Lang maintain that much of the resource mobilization 
work is faddish behavior because it simply relahles old ideas and concepts. This 
charge was directed toward those engaged in what we earlier called the bandwagon 
effect rather than the original formulators. Again resource mohilization 
proponents argue that some faddish behavior is involved and reflected through 
lahels. McCarthy stated, "part of why Zald and I get so much play is that we 
spend a whole lot of time generating terms. A lot of people just use those 
terms, so we get cited because we invented and coined some phrases ." However, 
Gamson's response captured the overall reaction of resource mohilization 
proponents: 
I'm admitting that there is a degree of faddishness in it, but I think 
that what happens with renaming is that it really puts it into a 
different overall organizing framework and gives it a different meaning. 
It's more than relabeling in the sense that its a rethinking and a 
reconceptualization of some phenomena that they [collective behaviorists] 
have been concerned with . 
Morover, as Turner noted, theoretical shifts in general generate some faddish 
hehavior. Indeed, faddishness facilitate paradigmatic shifts and provide them 
with visibility that assist in attracting scholars who make important substantive 
contributions. 
Given that resource 'mohilization has generated some theoretical 
breakthroughs as well as faddish hehavior, will it endure? Tilly addressed the 
issue: ,"If we want to keep this game together, we need two things desperately. 
We need some unifying theory, and we need some empirical demonstration. A school 
of thought that has neither isn't going to last very long. It is going to he a 
fad, a temporary coalition." Similarily Zald remarked, "I wouldn't make a lot of 
large claims for what the long term payoffs are. At this point, I think it's a 
little early to say that we are not just a fad and fashion." Zald concluded that 
the staying power of resource mohilization hinges on whether it is able to 
provide scholars with useful tools for their research on specific issues. 
Our empirical analysis demonstrated that there are a vast number of scholars 
contributing to the resource mobilization literature. This paradigmatic shift 
whether permanent or short-lived, has changed the field of social movements hy 
theoretically illuminating factors (e.g., tactics and strategies, organization, 
rationality, mobilization, outcomes, etc.) undeveloped in classical approaches. 
Indeed, new perspectives on social movements will have to take these important 
contributions of resource mobilization into account if they are to be 
comprehensive and deal with the realities of real social movements. 
Theoretical Problems and Conclusions 
The field of social movements is divided between two theoretical streams. 
There is the classical approach which stresses social psychological variables 
including ideology, deprivation, strain, social construction of reality and 
structural breakdown. On the other side is resource mobilization with its stress 
on structural variables including social organization, interest, resources, group 
conflict, mobilization, tactics and strategies and rational utilitarian logic. 
All of the theorists we interviewed on both sides of this theoretical divide 
maintain that both social psychological and structural variables are crucial to 
understanding social movements although they differ over how they should be 
combined into a comprehensive theory. The issue is whether it is possible to 
erase this bipolarity and combine the two approaches. 
. Our interview data reveal that 'the majority of the major formulators of 
collective behavior and resource mobilization theory will not work toward such a 
synthesis. Turner, who believes such a synthesis is possihle, made the case for 
collective behavior: 
I think we are going to move toward a better theory which takes a balance 
account. But to me collective behavior is the comprehensive term. 
Resource mobilization is a statement that narrows the field. It has to 
do with a part of it. But there is a stream to integrate it [resource 
mobilization] in. That stream [collective behavior] can't simply be 
wiped out and discarded. 
Tilly, making the case for resource mobilization, rejected Turner's basis for 
synthesis: 
First of all we don't want to. I mean as a matter of scientific strategy 
we don't want to integrate everything else into collective behavior 
theory because by and large, it rests on a premise that we ought to 
reject. That is the premise of a break in social structure and a 
reconstruction. I think it is one of the most misleading notions that 
sociologists have propounded, and I think that is the 19th century 
heritage right there. 
Gamson supported Tilly's view. He contended: 
I don't see how a theory is very comprehensive if it doesn't tell you 
anything ahout the organization and strategy of movement organizations; 
how they go ahout doing it, what strategies are successful or not 
successful. Collective hehavior has a selective focus. I favor 
integrating collective hehavior into resource mohilization to make it a 
comprehensive theory rather than the other way around. I think resource 
mohilization has the potential for heing a comprehensive theory. Mayhe 
it would have a different name. 
Thus, from a realistic standpoint it seems that the most to hope for is that this 
theoretical clash will generate additional insight from- which a comprehensive 
theory can he formulated in the future. The remaining discussion is geared 
toward that end. 
All the theorists we interviwed emphasized the crucial need for a theory 
that explains the role of ideology in movements. Turner concluded that we need 
to know "how certain world views hecome credihle and vital at some times hut not 
others." Similarily Tilly concluded, "a shared conception of what the world is 
ahout and of where a conflict group fits into the world underlies the whole 
process of.collective action." To explain the role of ideology there are several 
directions research should take. First the connection hetween ideology and prior 
social organization needs to he explicated. Thus Smelser argued that movement 
groups are often situated in prior organizations hut they are not necessarily 
organized in the name of social movement. He explained that, "you don't get 
mohilized just hecause you are in an organization. You get mohilized hecause 
your organization gets talked into helieving that your organizational goals are 
important from the standpoint of the movement." Hence, "the link is hetween the 
particular social movement and the preexisting organization. My helief is that 
is an ideological link." 
Preexisting social organization among oppressed groups often contain dormant 
ideologies that can he activated to support social protest. Morris (forthcoming 
1984) found that rnohilization in the civil rights movement was often accomplished 
hy ministers who activated the dormant revolutionary aspects of hlack religion 
already institutionalized within the hlack church. Blacks were pulled into the 
movement through the refocusing of the cultural content of the Bihle, songs, 
prayers, and sermons in such a way that they facilitated the rnohilization of 
protest. Moreover, changing attitudes hy refocusing the cultural content of 
institutions is much more effective than changing the attitudes of separate 
individuals, because this procedure enahles organizers to reach large numhers of 
people simultaneously. Thus research on institutional ideologies may shed light 
on what Turner refers to as the relationship hetween ohjectivri circumstances and 
the definition of the situation on which people actually act. 
Second, Tilly maintains that an understanding of ideology and movements may 
he accomplished hy investigating the process of struggle. That is, "a 
significant. part of the definition and redefinition comes out of the process of 
struggle itself." Thus, "ideology is not something that people 'acquire 
individually and somehow hring to a struggle." If the struggle itself redefines 
the identities of the parties, "it means that the history of a struggle or series 
of struggles will contain at least proximate answers to the questions of where 
world views come from." Tilly's view implies that to understand how the 
ideologies of "hlack power" and "hlack is heautiful" emerged during the mid 1960s 
one would investigate prior confrontations hetween hlacks, southern white power 
structures and the national government. Prior struggles might have revealed to 
hlacks that the ideology of "hlack and white together" yielded few suhstantive 
gains and that an independent hlack power hase could he more effective. By the 
same logic many whites recognized the implications of "hlack power" and thus 
generated the ideology of "white hack lash". Therefore, examining the process of 
ongoing struggles may shed light on the link hetween ideology and movements. 
Resource mohilization arguments pertaining to mohilization are often limited 
hy a utilitarian hias. This can he overcome in part hy returning to the central 
role that charisma often play in movements so well understood by Weher. However, 
Weher failed to link charisma with prior social organization and the mohilization 
of resources hecause his theory stressed an antithetical relationship hetween 
charisma and preexisting organization. To the contrary, h orris (forthcoming 
1984) found that in the civil rights movement charisma and organization were 
cojoined from the very heginning and were mutually reinforcing. Moreover, he 
found that the movement did not create charismatic leaders out of a vacuum, 
charisma as a social form already existed in the hlack church long hefore the 
movement. The movement provided a large stage for the further development of 
preexisting charismatic relationships enabling charisma to hecome an additional 
powerful force in the mohilization process. Further research is needed on the 
link hetween charisma and the development of social movements. 
The field of social movements needs a theory of what Tilly calls salience 
interests. By this he means an explanation of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages within a population that hecame repeatedly important to collective 
action. This sphere of theorizing is especially suitahle to marxian analyses 
hecause they have illuminated the role of class interest in revolutionary 
movements (see Paige, 1975). However, Marxist have failed to provide potent 
theoretical analysis of the movements of the 1960s. We need a clearer 
understanding of the array of interests that fueled those movements as well as a 
general theory of salience interests. 
Finally, as McCarthy-Zald pointed out, there is a need for a theory of the 
variahle relationships hetween social movements and state structures. For 
example, do some state structures contain characteristics that are more likely to 
generate movements and revolutions? (see Skocpol, 1979). A related question is 
whether a national state should- he conceptualized as a monolithic entity or 
whether local contradictions within a state structure generate movement activity? 
(see James, 1981). This is ripe territory for hoth Marxian and Weherian schools 
of the state. 
These are some of the important theoretical issues confronting movement 




Ahromowitz, S.I. 1973. "The comparative competence-adjustment of student left 
social-political activists." Journal of Personality 41:244-260. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1951. Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc. 
Aveni, Adrian F. 1978. "organizational linkages and resource mohilization." 
Sociological Quarterly 19:185-202. 
Bailis, Leonard. 1974. Bread or Justice. Lexington, MA: Heath. 
Bentham, Jeremy. 1789. Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
Blumer, Herhert. 1953. 
Blumer , Herbert. 1951. "Collective hehavior ." Pp. 166-222 in Alfred McClug Lee 
(ed) New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. New York: Barnes and Noble 
Books. 
Blumer, Herhert . 1957. "Collective hehavior ." Pp. 129-130 in J.B. Gittler (ed) 
Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade. New York: Wiley. 
Bwy, D. 1968. "Dimensions of political conflict in Latin America." American 
Behavaioral Scientist 11:39-50. 
The Central States Speech Journal. Winter. 1980. Volume 31, No. 4. 
Cantril, Hadley. 1941. The Psychology of Social Movements. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc. 
Coser , Lewis, 1977. Masters of Sociological Thought. Second Edition. New York: 
Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 
Coser, Lewis. 1956. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press. 
Croshy. 1976. "A model of egotistical relative deprivation." Psychological Review 
83:85-113. 
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1959. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Davies, James, C. 1976. 
Davies, James C. 1971. When Men Revolt and Why. New York: Free press. 
Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a theory of revolution." American Sociological 
Review 27 : 5-19. 
Dawson, C.A. and William A. Gettys. 1929. An Introduction to Sociology. New York: 
Ronald Press. 
Durkheim, Emile. 1933. Division of Labor in Society. New York: MacMillan. 
Feierahend, Ivo K., Betty A. Nesvold, and rosalind L. Feierahend. 1969. "Social 
change and political violence: Cross-national patterns." In H.D. Graham and T.R. 
Gurr (eds) Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. New 
York: Praeger. 
Feuer, Lewis. 1969. The Conflict of Generations. New York: Basic Books. 
Flacks, Richard. 1967. "The liherated generation: An exploration of the roots of 
student protest." Journal of Social Issues 23:52-75. 
Flanigan, W.H. and E. Fogelman. 1970. "Patterns of political violence in 
comparative historical perspective." Comparative Politics 3:l-20. 
Fogelson, Rohert and Rohert Hill. 1968. "Who riots? A study of participation in 
the 1967 riots." In Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Freeman, Jo. 1973. "The origins of the women's liheration movement." American 
Journal of Sociology 78:792-811. 
Gamson, William. Septemher. 1983. Interview. 
Gamson, William A. 1975. Strategy of Protest. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. 
Gamson, William A. 1980. "Understanding the careers of challenging groups." 
American Journal of sociology 85:104-1060. 
Gamson, William, Bruce Fireman, and Steven Rytina. 1982. Encounters with Unjust 
Authority. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. 
Gamson, William and Emilie Schmeidler. Forthcoming. "Organizing the poor." Theory 
and. Society. 
Gerlach, Luther P. and Virginia Hine. 1970. People, Power, Change: Movements of 
Social Transformation. Indianapolis: Bohhs-Merrill. 
Goldstone, Jack. 1980. "The weakness of organization." American Journal of 
Sociology 85:1017-1042. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1978. "Threshold models of collective hehavior." American 
Journal of sociology 83:1420-1443. 
Gurr, Ted. 1968. "A causal model of civil strife: A comparative analysis using 
new indices." American Political Science Review 62:1104-1124. 
Gurr, Ted. 1980. Handhook of Political Conflict. New York: Free Press. 
Gurr, Ted. 1973. "The revolution-social change nexus: Some old theories and new 
hypotheses." Comparative Politics 5:359-392. 
Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rehel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Gurr, Ted and Raymond Duval. 1973. "Civil conflict in the 1960's: A reciprocal 
theoretical system with parameter estimates." Comparative Political Studies 
6:135-170. 
Herberle, Rudolf. 1951. Social Movements: An Introduction to Political sociology. 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Hibbs, Douglass. 1973. Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis. 
New York: Wiley. 
Hobsbawn, E.J. 1959. Primitive Rebels. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Hoffer, Eric. 1951. True Believer. New York: American Library. 
Hopper, Rex. 1950. "The revolutionary process: A frame of reference for the study 
of revolutionary social movements." Social Forces 28:270-279. 
Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Isaac, Larry, E. Mutran, and Sheldon Stryker. 1980. "Political protest 
orientations among black and white adults." American sociological Review 
45:191-213. 
Isaac, Larry and William Kelly. 1981. "Racial insurgency, the state and welfare 
expansion." American'Journal of Sociology 86:1348-1386. 
James, David. 1981. The   ran sf or mat ion of Local State and Class Structures and 
Resistance to the Civil Rights Movement in the South. unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin. 
Jenkins,.. J. Craig. 1983. "Resource mobilization theory and the study of social 
movements." Annual Review of Sociology 9:527-553. 
Jenkins, J. Craig. 1982. "The transformation of a constituency into a movement." 
Pp. 52-70 in Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies. Jo Freeman (ed). New 
York: Longman. 
Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency of the powerless: Farm 
worker movements, 1946-1972." American Sociological Review 42:249-268. 
Keniston, Kenneth. 1968. Young Radicals. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. 
~erpelman, Larry C. 1972. Activists and Nonactivists. New York: Behavioral 
Publications. 
Killian, Lewis. September 1983. Interview. 
Killian, Lewis. 1964. "Social movements." Pp. 426-455 in Handbood of Modern 
Sociology.,Robert Faris (ed). Chicago: Rand McNally and Co. 
King, C. Wendell. 1956. Social Movements in the United States. New York: Random 
House. 
Kornhauser, William. 1959. The Politics of Mass Society. New York: Free Press. 
Lang, Kurt and Gladys Lang. 1961. Collective Dynamics. New York: Crowell. 
Lang, Kurt and Gladys Lang. Septemher 1983. Interview. 
Le Bon, Gustave. 1960. The Crowd. New York: Viking Press. 
Legget, John C. 1964. "Economic insecurity and working-class consciousness." 
American Sociological Review 29:226-234. 
Levin, V.I. 1975. What is to he Done? Peking: Foreign Language Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martia. 1963. Political Man. Garden City, NJ: Douhleday. 
Lipsky, Michael. 1968. "Protest as a political resource." American Political 
Science Review 62:1144-1158. 
Marx, Gary. 1979. 
Marx, Gary, 1974. "Thoughts on a neglected category of social movement 
participant: the agent provocateur and the informant." American Journal of 
Sociology 80:402-442. 
Marx, Gary and James L. Wood. 1975. "Strands of theory and research in collective 
behavior." Annual Review of Sociology 1:363-428. 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1968. "Manifests of the communist party." 
Selected Works 1:31-63. 
Maxwell, Gerald and Ruth Ames. 1979. "Experiments on the provision of puhlic 
goods." American Journal of Sociology 84:1335-1360. 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McCarthy, John. September. 1983. Interview. 
McCarthy, John D. and 'Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource mohilization and social 
movements: a partial theory." American Journal of Sociology 82:1212-1241. 
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. The Trends of Social Movements in 
America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. Morristown, NJ: General 
Learning Press. 
' McPhail, Clark. 1983. 
McPhail, Clark. 1973. "The assemhling process: A theoretical and empirical 
examination." American Sociological Review 38:721-735. 
McPhail, Clark and Ronald T. Wohlstein. 1983. "~ndividual and collective 
hehaviors within gatherings, demonstrations and riots." Annual Review of 
Sociology 9:579-600. 
Michels, Rohert. 1962. Political Parties. New York: Free Press. 
Mill, John Stuart. 1950. Utilitarianism, Liherty, and Repressive Government. 
London: J.M. Dent. 
I Mills, C. Wright. 1956. Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Molotch, Harvey. 1979. "Media and movements." Pp. 71-93 in Mayer Zald and John 
McCarthy (eds). the Dynamics of Social Movements. Camhridge, MA: Winthrop 
Puhlishers. e 
Morris, Aldon D. 1981. "Black southern student sit-in movement: An analysis of 
interal organization." American Sociological Review 46:755-767. 
Morris, Aldon D. 1984. Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: Free Press 
(forthcoming) . 
Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. The Mind and Society.. Andrew Bongiorno (trans.) New York: 
Hartcourt, Brace and Co. 
Oherschall, Anthony. Septemher. 1983. Interview. 
Oherschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Oherschall, Anthony. 1978h. "The decline of the 1960's social movements." 
Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change 1:257-289. 
Oherschall, Anthony. 1978a. "Theories of social conflict." Annual Review of 
Sociology 4:291-315. 
Olson, Mancur. 1963. "Rapid Growth as a Destahilizing Force." Journal of Economic 
History 23:529-552. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of Collective Action. Camhridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Orum, Anthony. 1972. Black Students in Protest. Washington, D.C.: American 
Sociological Association. 
I 
Orum, Anthony. 1978. Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy of 
the Body Politic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Paige, Jeffery. 1975. Agrarian Revolution. New York: Free Press. 
Paige, Jeffery. 1971. "Political orientation and riot participation." American 
Sociological Review 36:810-820. 
Park, Rohert. 1928. "Human migration and the marginal man." American Journal of 
Sociology 33:881-893. 
Park, Rohert and Ernest Burgess. 1921. Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Pareto, Wilfredo. 1935. The Mind and Society. Andrew Bongiorno (trans.) New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co. 
Parvin, Michael. 1973. "Economic determinants of political unrest: An economic 
approch." Journal of Conflict Resolution 17:271-296. 
Patinkin, Don. 1983. "Multiple discoveries and the central message." American 
Journal of Sociology 89:306-323. 
Pettigrew, Thomas. 1964. A Profile of the Negro American. Princeton, NJ: Van 
Nostrand. 
Pilisuk, Marc and Thomas Hayden. 1965. "Is there a military industrial complex 
which prevents peace?" Journal of Social Issues 21:67-117. 
Pinard, Maurice. 1983. "From Deprivation to Mohilization." Parts 1 and 2. Papers 
presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in 
Detroiz, MI. 
Pinard., Maurice and Richard Hamilton. 1977. "The independence issue and the 
polarization of the electorate." Canadian Journal of Political Science 
10: 215-259. 
Piven, Frances Fox and Richard Cloward. 1977. Poor People's Movement. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
Ritzer, George. 1983. Sociological Theory. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Rude, George. 1964. The Crowd in History. New York: Wiley. 
Salishury, Rohert H. 1969. "An exchange theory of interest groups." .Midwest 
Journal of Political Science 13:l-32. 
Selznick, Philip. 1960. The Organizational Weapon. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Sighle, Scipio. 1898. "Psychologie des sectes." Pp. 42-51 in M. giard. 
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolution. Camhridge: Camhridge 
University Press. 
Smelser, Neil. Septemher. 1983. Interview. 
Smelser, Neil. 1968. "Social and psychological dimensions of collective 
hehavior." Pp. 92-121 in Essays in Sociological Explanation. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Smelser, Neil. 1962. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: The Free Press. 
Smith, Adam. 1910. The Wealth of Nations. London: J.M. Dent. 
Snow, Davie, Louis Zurcher, and R. Peters. 1981. "Victory celehrations as 
theatre: A dramaturgial approach to crowd - hehavior." Symholic Interaction 
4 : 21-42. 
Snyder, David and William R. Kelly. 1976. "Industrial violence in Italy, 
1878-1903." American ~ournal of Sociology 83:131-162. 
Sohoul, Alhert. 1956. "The French rural community in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries." past and present 10:78-95. 
Tarde, Gahriel. 1903. The Laws of Imitation. E.C. Parsons (trans.) New York: 
Holt. 
Tarrow, Sidney, n.d. "Struggling to reform: Social movements and policy change 
during cycles of protest." Western Societies Papers: Cornell Studies in 
International Affairs. 
Tilly, Charles. 1973. "Does modernization hreed revolution?" Comparative Politics 
5:425-447. 
Tilly, Charles. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Tilly, Charles. Septemher. 1983. Interview. 
Tilly, Charles. 1979. "Social movements and national politics." CRSO Working 
Paper 8197. Ann Arhor, MI. 
Toch, Hans. 1965. The Psychology of Social Movements. Indianapolis: Bohhs-Merrill 
Co . 
Turner, Ralph. 1964. "Collective hehavior." Pp. 382-425 in Rohert E. L. Faris 
(ed) Handhook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Turner, Ralph. 1981. "Collective hehavior and resource mohilization as approaches 
. to social movements : Issues and continuities." Research in Social Movements, 
Conflict and Change 4:l-24. 
Turner, Ralph. Septemher. 1983. Interviews. 
Turner, Ralph and Lewis Killian. 1957. Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 1972. Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Walker, Jack L. 1983. "Origins and maintenance of interest groups in America." 
American Political Science Review 77:390-407. 
Wehh, Keith, ~kkart' Zimmerman, Michael Marsh, Anne-Marie Aish, Christina 
Mironesco, Christopher Mitchell, Leonardo Morlino and James Walton. 1983. 
"Efiology and outcomes of protest: New European perspectives." American 
Behavioral Scientist 26:311-331. 
Weher, Max. 1947. theory of social and Economic Organizations. Talcot Parsons' 
(ed) . New York: Free Press. 
Weher, Max. 1968. Economy and Society. Guenther Roth and claus Wittich (eds). New 
York: Bedminister Press. 
Weller, Jack and Ernest L. Quarantelli. 1973. "Neglected characteristics of 
collective hehavior ." American ~ournal of Sociology 79 : 665-685. 
Wolf, Eric. 1966. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Zald, Mayer. Septemher. 1983. Interview. 
Zald , Mayer N. and Roherta Ash. 1966. "Social movement organizations : Growth, 
decay, and change." social forces 44:327-341. 
Zimmerman, Ekkart. 1980. "Macro-comparative research on political protest." pp. 
167-327 in Handhook of Political Conflict. T. Gurr (ed). New York: Free Press. 
